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The regulation of the competitive process for product distribution and
promotion is an unsettled and incoherent area of antitrust law. Competition for
distribution involves contracting activity regarding the decision to carry,
promote, or place a particular product. This process includes business
practices recently subject to intense antitrust scrutiny such as slotting
allowances, discounts, bundled rebates, category management, and exclusive
dealing. Antitrust law has designed rules for each of these practices
independently, ignoring the economic relationships between these business
practices. Focusing on the economics of the competitive process for
distribution exposes an antitrust policy that systematically mishandles the
regulation of these contracts. These economic insights suggest that per se
legality for arrangements less than one year in duration or arrangements that
foreclose less than 40% of total distribution would improve consumer welfare
without significant risk of anticompetitive harm.
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Introduction
The regulation of the competitive process for product distribution and
promotion is an unsettled and sometimes incoherent area of antitrust law. One
potential explanation for the lack of coherence and consistency in this area is
the expansive nature of the subject matter. Marketing and distribution practices
encompass a large and diverse set of contractual relationships between
manufacturers and retailers.' The search for a single legal standard sufficient to
gauge the competitive impact of this diverse set of practices may be the cause
of much of the confusion. A second explanation is that problems in the antitrust
law governing distribution relationships are caused by a fundamental
misunderstanding of the economics of these distribution relationships. This
paper explores the second explanation.
The scope of this Article is the regulation of competition for distribution,
which I define as manufacturer and retailer contracting activity regarding the
decision to carry, promote, or place a particular product. By this definition,
competition for distribution includes manufacturer payments to retailers for
shelf space in the forms of wholesale price discounts, slotting allowances, and
bundled rebates, coupled with exclusionary terms and category management
designed to prevent retailer "cheating." Recent antitrust litigation demonstrates
that competition for distribution has perplexed courts and antitrust agencies. I
define these practices more precisely in order to clarify the manufacturer and
retailer activities at issue.
Slotting allowances involve per-unit time payments for shelf space.
Though the term "slotting allowance" usually refers to the supermarket
industry, payments for premium distribution "space" occur in other retail
markets such as bookstores, department stores, and drug stores. Analogous
payments for promotional display also occur in other markets, such as
payments for space in a mutual fund supermarket or for radio airplay. The
distinguishing feature of slotting allowances is that manufacturers pay them up-
] I will refer to retailers as "dealers" and "distributors," while sellers are sometimes referred to
as "manufacturers."
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front for shelf time per unit, rather than for each unit that the retailer sells.
These variable payments can be thought of as a reduction in the manufacturer's
wholesale price. Both slotting allowances and wholesale price discounts belong
to the category of manufacturer expenditures for promotion and distribution
often labeled "trade promotions."2
Bundled rebates are another form of manufacturer payment to retailers for
distribution. The distinguishing characteristic of a bundled rebate is that the
manufacturer offers the retailer discounts that increase when the retailer also
purchases the manufacturer's products in other markets. For example, a
manufacturer might offer a retailer a 10% discount if it purchases product A, a
20% discount if the retailer purchases products A and B, and a 30% discount if
it purchases the manufacturer's full product line of A, B, and C.
A category management arrangement involves the retailer granting rights
to control offerings in a particular product category to a supplier known as the
"category captain." Though such arrangements vary across categories, category
captains generally analyze data from category sales, suggest shelf space
allocations, and work with the retailer to maximize category profits.
The primary contribution of this Article is to focus on the economic forces
underlying the competitive process for distribution, exposing significant and
frequently ignored relationships among these practices. This analysis suggests
modem antitrust policy systematically mishandles the regulation of distribution
contracts. This Article proposes improvements to this area of the law consistent
with the economic insights provided.
Part I of the paper summarizes the economics of competition for
distribution, relying heavily on a growing economics literature analyzing
manufacturer payments for distributor promotion and exclusive dealing. This
economic framework provides the basis for the legal analysis that follows. Part
II reviews the modem antitrust approach to distribution arrangements,
highlighting the recent struggles many courts have had in assessing the likely
competitive consequences of competition for distribution. Part III builds upon
the economic insights of Part I, arguing that per se legality is appropriate for
distribution contracts shorter than one year in duration as well as those that
foreclose rivals from less than 40% of distribution opportunities.
I. The Economics of Competition for Distribution
Competition for distribution is a crucial part of the competitive process in
a number of industries. Grocery manufacturers compete for valuable shelf
space, record labels compete for radio airplay, and firms of all sorts compete
for the attention of consumers across virtually all product markets. In these
2 Other forms of trade promotions involve the use of cooperative advertising reimbursement,
cash rebates, coupons, consignment programs, display allowances, off-invoice allowances, bill-back
allowances, or free goods. PHILIP KOTLER, MARKETING MANAGEMENT 489-90 (11 th ed. 2003).
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markets, we frequently observe manufacturers, rather than their dealers, making
promotional investments. The fundamental economic question is why?
Economists have explained that it is often more efficient for
manufacturers to make these investments by giving promotional assets to
retailers at zero price, subsidizing their purchases, or paying the dealer for
promotional performance. The economic reason that manufacturers must
purchase promotional services is that, under a rather broad set of conditions,
manufacturers will desire a greater level of promotion than dealers would
otherwise supply.3 This difference in incentives between manufacturers and
retailers with respect to the supply of promotional activity implies that joint
profit-maximization requires a separate distribution arrangement to compensate
the dealer for supply of the desired level of services. In other words, the
retailer, in the absence of such an arrangement, will not supply the jointly
profit-maximizing level of promotion. The following Section outlines the
economics of the dealer undersupply problem, and shows how manufacturers
and retailers use a variety of contractual forms to solve it.
A. Promotional Contracts Solve a Pervasive Incentive Incompatibility
Problem
Dealers will not supply or purchase sufficient promotion from the
manufacturer's point of view because they do not account for the additional
profit earned by the manufacturer on incremental sales from optimal promotion
decisions. Consequently, dealers may not supply the jointly optimal level of
promotional effort, even though the revenue earned on those sales is greater
than the costs of providing the services. Accordingly, manufacturers must
either pay for distribution or lose profitable incremental sales.
The incentive incompatibility between manufacturers and retailers with
regard to retail promotion can be illustrated mathematically. 4 As a comparative
benchmark, consider the retailer's incentives with respect to price competition.
Assume that the retailer's marginal cost of selling an additional unit of a
product to consumers, MCR, is equal to the wholesale price charged by the
manufacturer, Pw, plus the retailer's marginal cost of selling the product, MC,
which includes the retailer's costs of providing shelf space. The joint profit
maximizing condition with respect to price competition is:
3 The original statement of the dealer undersupply problem, and the role of various vertical
restraints in solving it, appears in Benjamin Klein & Kevin M. Murphy, Vertical Restraints as Contract
Enforcement Mechanisms, 31 J.L. & EcoN. 265 (1988). This analysis is extended in Ralph Winter,
Vertical Control and Price Versus Nonprice Competition, 108 Q.J. ECON. 61 (1993) and further
extended in Benjamin Klein & Joshua Wright, The Economics of Slotting Contracts (August 10, 2005)
(unpublished manuscript, on file with author), where a model of slotting allowances as a particular form
of manufacturer compensation for shelf space is presented and tested against available slotting data.
4 Klein & Wright, supra note 3, at 8-16, presents this analysis.
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dQR dQM(1) -- (PR -MC)= - (Pw-MCM)
dPR dPw
Notice that even when the manufacturer's margin is substantially larger
than the retailer's margin, in equilibrium dQR/ dPR will be proportionately
greater than dQM / dPw because a retail price decrease causes shifts in sales
between retailers (inter-retailer effects) that largely cancel out in terms of the
manufacturer's net sales increase, or inter-brand effects. Although retailers do
not take account of the manufacturer's much larger margin on incremental sales
when lowering price, competition results in the jointly profit-maximizing level
of retailer price competition because the manufacturer and retailers each adjust
their prices so that their respective margins completely and exactly offset the
increased retailer demand response with the higher manufacturer margin.
Therefore, manufacturer and retail pricing incentives are generally aligned
sufficiently such that a contract controlling the retailer's pricing conduct is not
required in order to maximize joint profits.
Klein and Murphy demonstrate that this offsetting effect does not occur
with many forms of promotion which do not involve significant inter-retailer
demand effects.5 This competitive distortion increases with the magnitude of
the manufacturer's margin: the difference between the wholesale price and the
manufacturer's marginal cost. Most differentiated products, for example, face
downward sloping demand curves and are sold significantly above marginal
cost. 6 Under these general conditions, manufacturers eam significant marginal
profit from incremental sales and have strong incentives to induce retailer
promotional efforts by compensating dealers for supplying additional
promotional services. 7 If we denote these forms of promotion, such as shelf
space, S, we can then assume that:
dQR = dQM
dS dS
Without substantial inter-retailer effects offsetting the manufacturer's
larger margin on incremental sales, we know that the retailer's profitability
from the incremental sales produced by its increased supply of S will be much
5 See id. (examining the retailer undersupply problem in the context of vertical restraints such
as exclusive territories or resale price maintenance which facilitate manufacturer payments to retailers
for supplying desired services).
6 This does not imply antitrust market power. See Benjamin Klein & John Shepard Wiley Jr.,
Competitive Price Discrimination as an Antitrust Justification for Intellectual Property Refusals to
Deal, 70 ANTITRUST L.J. 599 (2003) (noting that virtually all firms produce differentiated products but
do not necessarily possess antitrust market power).
7 Where all consumers equally value a particular retailer service, such as a well-lit store or
parking, the retailer is compensated for the investment by an increase in the retail price equal to the
value of the service supplied rather than by manufacturer payments.
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smaller than the manufacturer's return. Mathematically, Equation (3) represents
this deviation from the jointly profit-maximizing equilibrium:
(3) dQ (PR - MCR) < dQ (Pw- MCM)
dS dS
These conditions imply that profit-maximizing retailers will set S too low.
Notice that the conditions necessary for Equation (3) to hold are not very
restrictive: (1) heterogeneity in consumers' valuation of S; (2) a large
manufacturer's margin relative to the retailer's margin; and (3) substantial
inter-retailer effects of the provision of S. Under these conditions, the
manufacturer will want the retailer to provide more promotional shelf space for
its products than the retailer otherwise would. Because joint profits will
increase if the manufacturer can increase retail promotion levels, an economic
incentive exists for manufacturers to contract with retailers over the supply of
shelf space.8
Promotion exists to induce purchases from marginal consumers, or those
consumers who would not have purchased the product at current market prices.
Promotional effort pushes the reservation values of marginal consumers
towards or above the market price, while infra-marginal consumers' reservation
values are unaffected, or not increased to the market price, because they do not
respond to the promotion offered, such as valuable shelf space.
Consider the following numerical example to illustrate the competitive
distortion. Manufacturer X sells a brand name stereo. The wholesale price of
X's stereo to retailers is $150, and the competitive retail price is $200. Infra-
marginal consumers are purchasing the product at $200 and receiving consumer
surplus. A marginal consumer values X's stereo at $150, and therefore does not
purchase the product. Providing X's stereo premium shelf space would cost the
retailer $100 and increase its value to the marginal consumer by $50. However,
the retailer would not voluntarily supply the premium space. The incremental
sale earns the retailer $50, which does not cover the $100 promotional
expenditure. If the manufacturer's marginal cost is less than $50, however, the
manufacturer will purchase the promotion because the manufacturer's
incremental profit on the additional sale is greater than the total cost of
supplying premium shelf space.
The economic incentive to specify a separate contract for retail
distribution has significant implications for antitrust governance. This
competitive distortion not only provides a pro-competitive rationale for a set of
highly scrutinized practices, but it also permits an antitrust policy informed by
an improved economic understanding of distribution relationships.
8 Where inter-retailer demand effects exist from the provision of a particular promotional
service, the retailer will provide these services without manufacturer compensation because it will adjust
its retail prices to reflect the increased consumer demand.
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While this incentive incompatibility shows the need for a separate contract
governing retailer supply of promotional activity, it does not determine the
form that the contract should take. Generally speaking, it is useful to think of
manufacturers as seeking promotional effort that will increase total sales by a
specified percentage. Manufacturers can resort to a variety of contractual forms
to compensate retailers for this additional promotional activity. For example,
the manufacturer might lower the wholesale price by a certain amount and
engage in de facto resale price maintenance, offer cooperative advertising
dollars to be rescinded if the dealer prices below a specified price, pay the
retailer a per-unit time slotting allowance, use quantity-based rebates, or give
the retailer other valuable consideration for its increased promotional effort.
While the particular form of the promotional contract is not the focus of
this Article, it is an interesting and important economic question. 9 One aspect
of this form question is relevant to the analysis herein. Specifically, a key
determinant of the contractual form is the degree of inter-retailer competition in
the particular product market, or the individual retailer price elasticity of the
product.
Where intense inter-retailer competition exists for a particular product-
that is, where a price increase induces significant store switching among
consumers--competition will likely decrease the retailer's premium. The
payment to the retailer will be competed away in the form of lower prices. The
dissipation of this premium reduces the retailer's incentive to supply the
bargained-for promotion. Thus, in the case of high inter-retailer competition,
one might expect increased incidence of resale price maintenance or per-unit
time payments to address this problem. Resale price maintenance prevents the
retailer from reducing the price below a certain level. Similarly, a per-unit time
payment such as a slotting allowance is less likely to be dissipated by price
competition on the particular product. One can think of slotting payments as
having the advantage over quantity-based discounts in that the former allow
greater flexibility in selecting the margin upon which manufacturers pass the
payment on to consumers. Therefore, this model predicts that resale price
maintenance and slotting allowances are more likely to be observed where
inter-retailer competition is particularly intense and that discounts are sufficient
to compensate the retailer when inter-retailer competition is minimal.
B. Transactors Use a Variety of Contractual Mechanisms To Reduce
Retailer Incentives To Cheat on Promotional Contracts
Promotion contracts create a large and diverse set of free-riding
opportunities for retailers. Because manufacturers pay retailers up front for
some specified performance, such as prominent display or premium shelf space
9 See Klein & Wright, supra note 3 (analyzing the economic forces leading parties to adopt a
variety of contractual forms).
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retailers can shirk on the contractual arrangement in a number of ways, such as
failing to supply the desired and paid-for promotional effort, or promoting rival
brands. 10
These free-riding strategies may impose significant costs on the parties
and undermine the underlying distribution contract. However, we can expect
profit-maximizing transactors to attempt to minimize the costs associated with
the numerous forms of dealer free-riding. It is therefore unsurprising that the
normal competitive process for distribution leads to the combination of
promotional contracts and restraints intended to minimize free-riding.
Exclusive dealing is one contractual mechanism by which the parties can
minimize forms of dealer free-riding involving the switching of promotional
effort to rival brands." Exclusive dealing reduces the retailer's incentive to
cheat on the promotional contract because manufacturers can easily detect
violations (the presence of another product). However, exclusive dealing can be
prohibitively costly where consumers have significant demand for inter-brand
product variety. One would expect transactors' choice of contractual form to
minimize both free-riding and loss-of-variety costs.
Category management is another contractual mechanism, related to
exclusive dealing, which reduces retailer incentives to cheat on the promotional
agreement. Klein and Wright illustrate that category management arrangements
reflect a tradeoff of these costs that is less restrictive than exclusivity, but
nonetheless has attracted unwarranted skepticism with respect to its potential
for exclusionary abuse.'2 This common marketing device grants a manufacturer
some level of input with respect to the retailer's shelf space allocation and
product selection decisions and is pervasive in supermarkets, drugstores and
bookstores. 13 Like exclusive dealing, category management reduces the
retailer's ability to deviate from the specified or implied desired level of
promotional performance by placing those decisions in the hands of the
category manager, or lowering the costs of detection as a result of the
manager's increased involvement in shelf space allocation.
10 Benjamin Klein & Andres V. Lerner, How Exclusive Dealing Prevents Free-Riding: An
Economic Analysis of Dentsply (2006) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author), provides a useful
taxonomy of dealer free-riding strategies. Klein and Lemer demonstrate that Howard Marvel's seminal
explanation of the role of exclusive dealing in protecting manufacturer-supplied promotional
investments, Howard P. Marvel, Exclusive Dealing, 25 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1982), incorrectly concludes
that exclusive dealing does not prevent dealer free-riding on manufacturer paid-for promotional
investments. To the contrary, Klein and Lerner show that exclusive dealing prevents both forms of free-
riding.
II Klein & Lerner, supra note 10.
12 Benjamin Klein & Joshua Wright, The Antitrust Law and Economics of Category
Management (March 1, 2006) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
13 Id. See also Mary Anne Mason & Paul B. Hewitt, Category Management: An Interview
with FTC Commissioner Thomas B. Leary (last modified March 28, 2005),
http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/leary/050328abainterview.pdf (noting that the "extent to which the
category manager actually gets into the details of promoting and pricing varies from retailer to retailer").
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The key economic insight is to identify the relationship between these two
economic phenomena: manufacturer payments for promotion and exclusionary
contractual mechanisms such as exclusive dealing and category management.
Table 1 combines the economic insights presented thus far into a simple
prediction of contract form focusing on two key underlying features of the
distribution relationship: the degree of product-specific inter-retailer
competition and consumer demand for variety.
14
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Antitrust law has failed to fully recognize the link between these
contractual arrangements. The result has been significant antitrust exposure for
firms engaging in each of these each practices, and a confused state of affairs in
the antitrust jurisprudence of exclusionary distribution contracts.
C. Competition for Distribution Benefits Consumers
A question of fundamental importance to antitrust policy is whether
payments to retailers resulting from competition for distribution benefit
consumers. While much attention has been paid to whether these payments can
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deprive rivals of efficient scale or are predatory in the below-cost sense, the
policy discussion has either ignored the possibility that these payments might
benefit consumers or has erroneously assumed that some payments are not
passed on in a competitive retail environment. This assumption has been
particularly problematic in the discussion of fixed rebates such as slotting
allowances, where it is often said that these payments do not create an incentive
to lower retail prices and are therefore likely to be anticompetitive. For
example, several economists at the Federal Trade Commission Workshop on
Slotting Allowances hypothesized that the fixed form of slotting allowances
implied that they would not be passed on to consumers.'
5
This view does not make economic sense in a competitive retail
environment. If retailers earn a competitive rate of return, increased distribution
payments should be offset by either lower retailer margins or higher retailer
expenditures on non-price services. In other words, retailers are likely to invest
these payments in forms of competition likely to have inter-retailer effects,
such as an increase in store traffic. There is no evidence suggesting that shelf
space payments have increased retailer profits. Klein and Wright illustrate that
during the time period associated with drastic increases in the use of slotting
allowances, beginning in 1981, retailer profitability remained constant16
Contrary to the frequently expressed view that payments are not passed on to
consumers, 17 constant retail profits and increasing manufacturer payments
imply that consumers benefit from competition for distribution.
It is important to note that the form of payment is likely to impact how,
not whether, consumers benefit from competition from distribution. In other
words, while one should not expect a per unit time slotting allowance paid by
Coca-Cola to result in lower Coca-Cola prices per se, this does not mean that
consumers do not reap substantial benefits from the payments since these
dollars are passed on through other means, such as lower prices on other
products or increased amenities.
This insight presents a challenge in terms of how antitrust law should
account for benefits passed on to consumers outside the relevant antitrust
market. Measuring the benefits created by distribution payments in a multi-
product retail environment is likely to be very difficult. Even more difficult is
the prospect of evaluating these benefits against any potential anticompetitive
effects. While stylized models that do not incorporate the competitive virtues of
competition for distribution add to our knowledge of these practices by
isolating particular economic forces, these models are not built for analyzing
15 See, e.g., FED. TRADE COMM'N, REPORT ON THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION
WORKSHOP ON SLOTTING ALLOWANCES AND OTHER MARKETING PRACTICES IN THE GROCERY
INDUSTRY 27-28, available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2OOI/O2/slottingallowancesreportfinal.pdf ; 2
Transcript of Workshop on Slotting Allowances 180-81 (June 1, 2000), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/bc/slotting/slotting61.pdf (comments of Greg Shaffer).
16 Klein & Wright, supra note 3, at 17.
17 See supra note 15.
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the tradeoffs inherent in evaluating net competitive effects. Unremarkably,
these models cannot improve the design of antitrust rules by simultaneously
identifying potentially anticompetitive distribution practices while protecting
consumers' interests in the indirect benefits passed on to them through retail
competition. 18
While formulating a workable antitrust rule that precisely captures both of
these effects is likely impossible, a reasonable first step is to design a standard
that ensures consumers will receive these benefits where there is little to no risk
that competition for distribution will harm competition. The first principle of
such an antitrust rule must be to allow manufacturers to compete vigorously for
distribution by reducing prices or, equivalently, by making payments to
distributors. Antitrust policy follows this principle with respect to predatory
pricing law. Because manufacturer payments for distribution result in indirect
benefits to consumers that are similar to the direct benefits consumers receive
from price competition, this principle ought to apply quite naturally. 19 As Judge
(now Justice) Breyer explained in Barry Wright Corp. v. ITT Grinnell Corp.,
"the antitrust laws very rarely reject such beneficial 'birds in the hand' for the
sake of more speculative (future low-price) 'birds in the bush.' 20 Likewise, the
certain benefits of competition for distribution suggest that such practices
should be judged by a standard similar to those used to identify illegal
21predatory price competition. Part II describes the confused state of modern
antitrust analysis of competitive practices employed in the market for product
distribution.
II. Antitrust Regulation of Competition for Distribution
Modern antitrust enforcement battles frequently concern competitive
issues surrounding product distribution and promotion. Neither manufacturer
purchase of distribution and promotion nor the use of vertical restraints to
prevent dealer free-riding have escaped antitrust scrutiny. For example, slotting
arrangements have played a central role in recent antitrust litigation,22
18 For a discussion of the bundling literature, including bundled rebates, see Bruce H.
Kobayashi, Does Economics Provide a Reliable Guide to Regulating Commodity Bundling by Firms? A
Survey of the Economic Literature, I J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 707 (2006). [hereinafter Kobayashi,
Survey of the Economic Literature]; Bruce H. Kobayashi, Two Tales of Bundling: Implications for the
Application of Antitrust Law to Bundled Discounts, AEl/Brookings Joint Center Monograph
(forthcoming 2006) (George Mason Univ. Sch. of Law, Law & Econ. Working Paper No. 05-27, 2005)
[hereinafter Kobayashi, Two Tales].
19 See Kobayashi, Two Tales, supra note 18.
20 724 F.2d 227, 234 (1st Cir. 1983).
21 See, e.g., Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209 (1993);
Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986).
22 See, e.g., Conwood Co. v. United States Tobacco Co., 290 F.3d 768 (6th Cir. 2002); FTC v.
H.J. Heinz Co., 116 F. Supp. 2d 190 (D.D.C. 2000), rev'd, 246 F.3d 708 (D.C. Cir. 2001); FTC v.
McCormick, FTC Dkt. No. C-3939 (2000).
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Congressional hearings, 23 and a FTC Workshop and Study.24 Other forms of
promotional payments, market-share discounts, bundled rebates, resale price
maintenance and cooperative advertising programs have not escaped
challenge. 25 Attempts to reduce retailer free-riding incentives, such as exclusive
dealing contracts and category management, have also been challenged.
European Union antitrust law has experienced similar controversy regarding
distribution arrangements. 26 This Part explores antitrust law with respect to
both manufacturer payments for distribution and contractual attempts to
minimize dealer free-riding on these promotional contracts.
A. Promotional Payments and Foreclosure Analysis
One set of cases involves allegations that a manufacturer's payment for
shelf space or promotion causes competitive harm. The common feature of
these claims is the allegation that the marketing arrangements are de facto
exclusive, depriving rivals of efficient scale for a significant period of time by
foreclosing opportunities for product distribution. These arrangements are
generally analyzed under the rule-of-reason framework, assessing whether the
defendant has market power, whether the challenged conduct "forecloses
competition in a substantial share of the line of commerce involved,, 27 and
23 Slotting Fees: Are Family Farmers Battling to Stay on the Farm and in the Grocery Store?:
Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Small Business, 106th Cong. (2000); Competitive Issues in Agriculture
and the Food Industry: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 106th Cong. (1999); Slotting:
Fair for Small Business and Consumers?: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Small Business, 106th Cong.
(1999).
24 FTC REPORT, supra note 15, at 11 & nn. 18-19. The FTC Report summarized the findings
of a workshop held from May 31 to June 1, 2000. See also FED. TRADE COMM'N STAFF STUDY,
SLOTTING ALLOWANCES IN THE RETAIL GROCERY INDUSTRY: SELECTED CASE STUDIES IN FIVE
PRODUCT CATEGORIES (2003) [hereinafter FTC STUDY].
25 See In re Compact Disc Minimum Adver. Price Antitrust Litig., 138 F. Supp. 2d 25 (D. Me.
2001); In re Sony Music Distrib. Inc., Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 24,746 (FTC Aug. 30, 2000) (consent
decree by which compact disc distributors agree to cease and desist from requiring dealers to use
distributor's minimum advertised price in order to obtain cooperative advertising dollars).
26 Slotting fees and other forms of shelf space payments were also involved in Coca-Cola's
recent settlement with the European Commission, which significantly limits Coca-Cola's ability to offer
rebates conditioned on exclusivity or specified levels of sales, as well as the amount of shelf space that it
can purchase from retailers. See Undertaking, Case Comp/39.116/B-2-Coca-Cola; see also Case T-
65/98, Van den Bergh v. Comm'n, 2003 E.C.R. 11-4653 (finding contractual exclusivity in the provision
of ice-cream freezers in violation of Articles 81 and 82); Case T-203/01, Michelin v. Comm'n, 2003
E.C.R. 11-04071 ("Michelin IX') (finding Michelin's rebate scheme in violation of Article 82).
27 Tampa Elec. Co. v. Nashville Coal Co., 365 U.S. 320, 329 (1961). Use of exclusive dealing
analysis in cases involving shelf space and promotional programs is common. See, e.g., Louisa Coca-
Cola Bottling Co. v. Pepsi-Cola Metro Bottling Co., 94 F. Supp. 2d 804, 816 (E.D. Ky. 1999); Beverage
Mgmt., Inc. v. Coca-Cola Bottling Corp., 653 F. Supp. 1144, 1153-54 (S.D. Ohio 1986); Bayou
Bottling, Inc. v. Dr. Pepper Co., 725 F.2d 300, 304 (5th Cir. 1984); cf Jonathan M. Jacobson, Exclusive
Dealing, "Foreclosure, '" and Consumer Harm, 70 ANTITRUST L.J. 311, 363 (2002) (arguing that
"foreclosure is a concept that [antitrust] analysis has largely forgotten," and that courts focus instead on
whether the exclusive dealing contracts increase the defendant's market power). However, the economic
logic of "raising rivals' costs" implies that distribution contracts cannot increase the defendant's market
power without depriving a rival of efficient scale. Jacobson does concede that the foreclosure inquiry
remains useful "as a screening device" in those cases "in which the factfinder is asked to infer
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whether there is likely to be competitive harm. The fundamental economic
inquiry in promotional payment cases is whether rivals are sufficiently
disadvantaged by the promotional program that they are unable to achieve
minimum efficient scale for a significant period of time. These conditions must
hold for a monopolist to increase barriers to entry.
A leading case addressing this issue involves Philip Morris ("PM") and its
"Retail Leaders" program. 28 Retail Leaders, introduced in October 1998,
involved four different "participation levels" corresponding to both the
magnitude of PM payments and the amount of advantageous display space
provided to PM. At the highest two levels of Retail Leaders, PM not only made
promotional payments to retailers but also granted retailers an "industry
fixture" that would occupy a specified percentage of total display space for
cigarettes. At the highest level, this percentage was 100%. At the mid-level of
Retail Leaders, the industry fixture would occupy half of the total category
display space, specifying that PM brands were to be allocated proportionately
to PM's market share (otherwise known as a "space-to-sales" allocation). The
other half of category space was to be divided between a "prime fixture"
constituting approximately 25% of category space and promoting only PM
brands and a "retailer's choice fixture" which would occupy the remaining 25%
of the space and contain competing brands and signage.
29
Several other details of the Retail Leaders program warrant mention. First,
PM paid retailers with per-unit discounts known as retail display allowances
("RDAs").3 Second, it was undisputed that Retail Leaders contracts were
terminable at will without penalty upon thirty days' notice.31 Third, under each
Retail Leaders level of participation, retailers were never required to grant PM
more than "space-to-sales," or a greater percentage of shelf space than its
market share.32
Several tobacco companies challenged Retail Leaders under both sections
1 and 2 of the Sherman Act. The court, after initially issuing a preliminary
injunction in favor of the plaintiffs, granted Philip Morris's motion for
summary judgment, dismissing the case on the grounds that PM did not have
market power, and alternatively, that the Retail Leaders program did not
sufficiently foreclose rivals from the market. Specifically, the court found that
Retail Leaders foreclosed only 34% of the market, that plaintiffs successfully
competitive harm from the fact that a large percentage of the relevant market has been tied up by the
challenged agreement." Id. This exception may swallow the rule, as distribution cases frequently require
the factfinder to make exactly this inference.
28 R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Philip Morris Inc., 199 F. Supp. 2d 362 (M.D.N.C. 2002)
("RJR I"), affdper curiam, 67 F. App'x 810 (4th Cir. 2003).
29 Id. at 370.
30 Id. at 369-70.
31 Id. at 371.
32 Id. at 370.
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competed against PM for premium shelf space and signage, and that retailers
were able to terminate agreements at will.
33
The result makes economic sense. In promotional payment cases,
manufacturer payments will be passed on to consumers through retail
competition. 34 Competition between tobacco manufacturers resulted in a boon
to consumers as RDAs were passed on in the form of lower prices.35 While
anticompetitive foreclosure is a viable concern, the key policy requirement is
that the competitive process for distribution is left "open," meaning that rival
manufacturers have the opportunity to bid for shelf space. This condition is
clearly satisfied where contracts are of short duration and easily terminable like
36those in the Retail Leaders program. In fact, it appears that PM's relative
prices fell after the implementation of Retail Leaders, suggesting that the
program was pro-competitive.
37
R.JR H illustrates the standard framework in exclusionary distribution
cases, requiring plaintiffs to show monopoly power and substantial foreclosure
and focusing on whether the duration of contract prohibits competitive bidding
by rivals. RJR H also highlights one of the interesting challenges for antitrust in
the context of complex promotional programs designed to increase a
manufacturer's shelf space or display presence: the differential "substantial
foreclosure" analysis in cases involving payments for shelf space. In addition to
addressing this issue, I will also briefly address how the availability of
Robinson-Patman Act as an alternative enforcement method affects the
regulation of distribution practices and how the competition for distribution
perspective informs the current debate on bundled rebates triggered by the
recent Third Circuit decision in LePages.
38
33 Id. at 391 ("Because Retail Leaders agreements are terminable at will with thirty days
notice, retail product and display space are subject to uninterrupted competitive bidding, and Plaintiffs
are not substantially foreclosed from the relevant market.").
34 Supra Part I.C. Grocery retailer profitability has remained largely unchanged, with after tax
profits as a percentage of assets averaging 4.53% during 1980-83 and only 4.15% during 1983-97. Klein
& Wright, supra note 3, at 17. These results are consistent with the conclusion that competition has
continued in the grocery retail market despite significant increases in retail grocery concentration over
the past two decades. See Joshua Wright, Vons Grocery and the Concentration-Price Relationship in
Grocery Retail, 48 UCLA L. REV. 743 (2001).
35 R.J. Reynolds's economic expert conceded this point during the litigation. R.JR H, 199 F.
Supp. 2d at 369-70. The fact that PM paid significant promotional payments is consistent with the very
high margins on tobacco products, giving tobacco manufacturers the incentive to pay for premium shelf
space and signage that might induce incremental sales.
36 The court made exactly such a finding. Id. at 391. Whether short-term agreements do not
have substantial anticompetitive effects as a matter of law is an open issue subject to debate across the
circuits. See cases cited infra note 115.
37 See Peter Bronsteen et al., Price Competition and Slotting Allowances, 50 ANTITRUST
BULL. 267 (2005).
38 LePage's, Inc. v. 3M, 324 F.3d 141, 146 (3d. Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 124 S. Ct. 2932
(2004).
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1. Shelf Space Foreclosure and "Space-to-sales"
Courts sometimes analyze foreclosure levels differently in shelf space
cases. One commentator summarizes current antitrust law as "routinely
sustain[ing] the legality of exclusive dealing arrangements with foreclosure
percentages of 40 percent or less." 39 In the shelf space context, courts have
frequently substituted the "space-to-sales" ratio as a rule of thumb for
substantial foreclosure rather than adhering to the established 40% levels or
some other fixed percentage. The space-to-sales rule concludes that a dominant
firm has achieved substantial foreclosure when it enters promotion contracts
that require retailers to supply a percentage of category shelf space exceeding
manufacturer's market share.
This rule likely owes its roots to an FTC investigation of ready-to-eat
cereals. 40 Subsequent to that investigation, federal courts have frequently used
the "space-to-sales" rule as a guideline in monopolization cases involving
manufacturer discounts and slotting fees paid to retailers. 41 In R.JR II, PM
persuaded the court that foreclosure was not likely because PM obtained space
in an amount "equal or less than its market share" and sometimes "only 90% of
its share of product space," whereas RJR obtained contracts granting
significantly more space than its market share.42
The space-to-sales ratio substitutes sophistication and accuracy for
convenience and ease of calculation. Were a comparison of market share to
shelf share an accurate indicator of potential for competitive harm, perhaps the
ratio would be defensible. It is not. An inference of competitive injury derived
solely from the fact that one firm is able to obtain distribution share greater
than its market share is likely to lead to problematic results.
39 Jacobsen, supra note 27, at 324 n.85. Professor Hovenkamp suggests 20% as the minimum
foreclosure percentage and 50% as a level at which courts should routinely condemn foreclosure. See
HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES AND THEIR
APPLICATION para. 1821 c, at 160 (2005).
40 See In re Kellogg Co., 99 FTC 8 (1982). Factual findings 460 and 461 in that case
supported "space-to-sales," or allocation of shelf space in proportion to market share, as a method that
"ensured that the retailers would avoid out-of-stocks and over-stocks, increase their efficiency and
profitability and reduce labor costs." Id. at para. 460. The findings of fact also stated that "[s]ales
volume is, and has been, the basic method of space allocation throughout grocery stores." Id. at para.
461.
41 In Frito Lay, Inc. v. Bachman Co., 659 F. Supp. 1129, 1134 (S.D.N.Y. 1986), the court
dismissed a section 1 claim due to failure to allege that Frito Lay's contracts obtained a greater share of
shelf space than its market share warranted. The Fifth Circuit rejected a similar monopolization claim
using the "space-to-sales" guideline in Bayou Bottling v. Dr. Pepper, 725 F. 2d 300, 304 (5th Cir. 1985).
See also Louisa Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Pepsi-Cola Metro Bottling Co., 94 F. Supp. 2d 804, 816
(E.D. Ky. 1999); Beverage Mgmt., Inc. v. Coca-Cola Bottling Corp., 653 F. Supp. 1144, 1153-54 (S.D.
Ohio 1986).
42 199 F. Supp. 2d at 388, 390. PM's appellate brief argues that PM did not substantially
foreclose the market because "Philip Morris receives only its market share of display and advertising
space," "PM asks for no more than space-to-sales proportionality," and "space-to-sales marketing
strategies such as this are a 'common place tool for competitors' and are wholly lawful," citing Frito
Lay and Bayou Bottling. Brief of Appellee at 48-51, 199 F. Supp. 2d 362 (2002) (No. 02-1295) (quoting
Frito Lay, 659 F. Supp. 2d at 1134, and citing Bayou Bottling, 725 F.2d at 304).
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The key foreclosure inquiry for both courts and economists is whether
competitors are prevented from reaching minimum efficient scale for a
significant period of time. The answer requires evidence of manufacturer-level
scale economies, ease of entry, availability of alternative methods of
distribution, and duration of the marketing arrangements. These conditions
necessarily vary by industry and require the type of hands-on analysis
conducive to rule-of-reason analysis. Rules of thumb such as space-to-sales are
surely useful marketing tools for retailers determining shelf space allocation,
but are just as certainly misguiding and inaccurate tools for antitrust analysis" 3
Further, use of the space-to-sales ratio injects additional uncertainty into
the product distribution equation for manufacturers with monopoly power. The
set of distribution practices such a manufacturer is able to use to defend its
monopoly position under a space-to-sales regime is likely to be very different
than those under a typical foreclosure rule. This additional layer of uncertainty
in distribution cases is likely to deter consumer welfare enhancing distribution
contracts in an effort to avoid uncertain antitrust liability.
2. Robinson-Patman Liability
The Robinson-Patman Act ("the Act") prohibits certain discriminatory
pricing and promotional programs in connection with the sale and distribution
of products in the United States."" The Act is complex, its application is
confusing, and its role in regulating the competitive process for distribution is
unclear. This subsection does not purport to provide an exhaustive review of its
application.45 I focus solely on summarizing the Act's application to
promotional shelf space payment programs.
A brief introduction to the Act's provisions is in order. Section 2(a) of the
Act is applicable to discrimination in prices that adversely affects
46competition. Section 2(c) prohibits dummy brokerage and has been applied to
commercial bribery and sham transactions. 7 Sections 2(d) and 2(e) prohibit
discriminatory promotional programs or discriminatory granting of allowances,
services or facilities in connection with the resale of a product.a8 Finally,
section 2(f) prohibits a buyer from knowingly inducing or receiving a
discriminatory price.4 9 Plaintiffs must prove competitive injury regardless of
the provision under which their claim falls. However, the Act allows plaintiffs
43 Contracts specifying large percentage shelf space requirements, including space-to-sales
contracts, may allow manufacturers to commit to providing sufficient variety while limiting dealer's
free-riding incentives.
44 15 U.S.C. §§ 13-13b, 21a (2000).
45 See generally Barbara 0. Bruckman, Discounts, Discrimination, and Exclusive Dealing:
Issues Under the Robinson-Patman Act, 68 ANTITRUST L.J. 253 (2000).
46 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (2000).
47 Id. § 13(c).
48 Id. § 13(d), 13(e).
49 Id. § 13(f).
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to prove competitive injury at one of three levels, depending on the type of
promotional activity involved antl on the provision under which the plaintiff
brought the action. 0
Plaintiffs may bring Section 2(a) claims against manufacturer promotional
programs that encourage product purchases, maintain adequate inventory, or
monitor product sales.5 1 In rival supplier cases, the section 2(a) standard is
analytically similar to the predatory pricing standard, as plaintiffs must
generally show competitive harm in the form of below-cost pricing and likely
recoupment, the standard for a primary-line injury.52 Disfavored retailers may
also successfully bring claims under section 2(a) challenging a promotional
program by proving second-line injury, i.e. evidence that the disfavored retailer
was harmed relative to favored retailers.
53
Section 2(c) prohibits "any person ... to pay or grant, or to receive or
accept, anything of value as a commission, brokerage, or other compensation,
or any allowance or discount in lieu thereof, except for services rendered in
connection with the sale or purchase of goods . . . ,54 Section 2(c) has been
suggested as an alternative approach to challenging slotting arrangements given
the difficulties of proving competitive injury associated with section 2(a)
claims, though section 2(c) cases have had highly variable outcomes. 55 Some
courts have declined to extend section 2(c) to slotting allowances and incentive
programs that are more properly analyzed under sections 2(a), 2(d), 2(e), or the
Sherman Act.
56
50 The Robinson-Patman Act specifies three levels of competitive harm. Primary line injury is
akin to the competitive injury in monopolization cases, i.e., injury to competition in the upstream
market. Secondary-line injury may be shown between favored and disfavored customers, i.e., the
"injury" of a retailer receiving less favorable allowances than other retailers may be sufficient to state a
claim in a secondary-line case. Finally, tertiary line injury occurs between the retailers' customers.
51 Though the language of section 2(d) appears to apply more naturally to claims involving
payment for preferential shelf space or promotion, several recent cases indicate that courts are also
willing to analyze these cases under section 2(a).
52 Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209 (1993).
53 In Hygrade Milk, for example, the court analyzed a group of plaintiff-distributors claims
against Tropicana's distribution practices under section 2(a). Hygrade Milk & Cream Co. v. Tropicana
Prods., Inc., 1996-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 71,438 (S.D.N.Y. 1996). The plaintiff-distributors attacked
Tropicana's pricing promotions, including the failure to offer slotting allowances to the plaintiffs'
retailer-customers. Though the court mistakenly addressed whether the distributors' customers paid
different prices for the product rather than whether the distributor paid a higher price than direct buying
retailers, which would have properly established tertiary line injury, the claim was allowed to proceed
under sections 2(a) and 2(d). Id.
54 15 U.S.C. § 13(c).
55 In Zeller Corp. v. Federal-Mogul Corp., 1999-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 72,522, 1999 U.S.
App. LEXIS 6345 (6th Cir. 1999), the Sixth Circuit dismissed a claim alleging that a signing bonus not
requiring additional services fell within section 2(c), while the court in Atlantic Coast Vess Beverages,
Inc. v. Farm Fresh, Inc., No. 3:93CV284 (E.D. Va. 1993), found a slotting fee payment in violation of
section 2(c).
56 See Lupia v. Stella D'Oro Biscuit Co., 586 F.2d 1163, 1169-70 (7th Cir. 1998); Empire
Rayon Yam Co. v. Am. Viscose Corp., 364 F.2d 491, 492 (2d Cir. 1966) (en banc); cf Yeager's Fuel,
Inc. v. Pa. Power & Light Co., 953 F. Supp. 617, 665 (E.D. Pa. 1997) (holding that the case "would
implicate § 2(c) if [defendant] paid special consideration to the buyer, an agent of the buyer, or an
intermediary subject to the buyer's control [to influence its buying decision]"). In Augusta News Co. v.
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Section 2(d) applies to payments for preferential shelf space or in-store
positioning and seems to be the provision most naturally applied to distribution
payments.57 However, it is unclear whether manufacturers have standing to
challenge rivals' promotional programs. 58 Retailers, on the other hand, may
bring a section 2(d) claim by showing either primary-line or secondary-line
injury. 59 Importantly, proof of discriminatory allowances causing the plaintiff
to lose sales to the favored retailer and reduction in the plaintiffs profits are
each sufficient to prove competitive injury under this standard.
The Act leaves private plaintiffs and enforcement agencies with the more
favorable secondary-line injury standard and leaves manufacturers with a
thorny maze of compliance issues. The availability to enforcement agencies of
the more lenient secondary-line injury standard might be defended on the
grounds that it is rarely used, but this is not a compelling defense of the Act.6
0
Even sparing application of the Act is likely to reduce consumer welfare by
chilling competition for distribution. Further, the recent FTC enforcement
action against McCormick Spice Company demonstrates that the Act is a
weapon within the arsenals of the agencies.
McCormick was brought under section 2(a) of the Act. McCormick is the
largest American supplier of spices to grocery stores. 61 The company's leading
rival, Bums Philip Food, Inc. ("Bums"),62 instigated a price war in the early
1990s. McCormick responded to the price decrease by offering increased
discounts and a variety of other payments to retailers.63 The company's
payment programs commonly included partial exclusivity requirements. In
some cases, McCormick and the retailer agreed that the latter would provide
Hudson News Co., 269 F.3d 41 (lst Cir. 2001), the court refused to apply section 2(c) to analyze a
newspaper distributor's practice of offering large, up-front per-store fees in exchange for exclusivity,
recognizing that the distributor payments were "simply price reductions offered to the buyers for the
exclusive right to supply a set of stores under the multi-year contracts." Id. at 45.
57 See Frito-Lay, Inc. v. Bachman Co., 659 F. Supp. 1129, 1139-40 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (slotting
payments may be analyzed under Section 2(a) or Section 2(d)); Mary L. Azcuenaga, Comm'r, Fed.
Trade Comm'n, The Robinson-Patman Act: A Perspective from the FTC, Remarks before the ABA
Section of Antitrust Law and Corporate Counsel Center, Northwestern University School of Law (May
13, 1993) ("Slotting allowances ... to obtain access to a store in connection with the initial sale...
generally are analyzed as plain vanilla discounts... under Section 2(a) .... Slotting allowances ... for
preferential display space... generally are analyzed [under Section 2(d)]").
58 See Ashkanazy v. I. Rokeach & Sons, Inc., 757 F. Supp. 1527, 1553-54 (N.D. Ill. 1991);
Frito Lay, 659 F. Supp. at 1140-41.
59 See, e.g., Hygrade Milk, supra note 53.
60 Professor Hovenkamp recently testified to the Antitrust Modernization Commission in
favor of repealing the Act, while recognizing that this option is unlikely to be politically feasible. See
Herbert Hovenkamp, Written Testimony on the Robinson-Patman Act (July 2, 2005), available at
http://amc.gov/commissionhearings/pdf/Hovenkamp.pdf ("as currently enforced [the Act] is a socially
costly statute that produces no benefits to competition that could not be secured by means of litigation
under the Sherman Act.").
61 McCormick & Co., Inc., FTC File No. 961-0050, Dissenting Statement of Commissioners
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90% of its shelf space devoted to spices to the company. 64 McCormick signed
more than 2000 contracts with retailers, accounting for the majority of spice
sales in the United States.
65
The FTC rejected the possibility of alleging a primary-line theory, which
would require a showing that the discriminatory prices charged by McCormick
were below-cost and that McCormick had a reasonable prospect of recouping
its losses, 66 in favor of the secondary-line injury theory that McCormick's
discriminatory pricing decreased disfavored retailers' capacity to compete
against favored retailers. As evidence of this claim, the FTC pointed to five
specific instances where McCormick charged higher prices to certain grocery
stores than it charged to their competitors. 67 Over the dissent of two
Commissioners, McCormick ultimately agreed to a consent order with the FTC
preventing its use of discriminatory prices between retailers.
68
One cynical explanation of the Commission's choice to bring the case on
a secondary-line theory was that the Commission could not prevail under the
69
more stringent primary-line standard. It is difficult to assess the validity of
this claim. In particular, it is unclear what percentage of total distribution
McCormick contracts, which required participating retailers to dedicate up to
90% of their spice category shelf space to McCormick's products, foreclosed
64 McCormick & Co., Inc., FTC File No. 961-0050, Complaint, 12 [hereinafter Complaint].
The complaint actually alleges that McCormick discriminated in price "in no fewer than five instances..
. by providing different deal rates consisting of preferential upfront 'slotting'-type payments or
allowances, discounts, rebates, deductions, free goods, or other financial benefits to some purchasers of
McCormick products including, but not limited to, McCormick's spice line .... Id. The complaint also
alleges that the different "net price" paid by favored purchasers "were not justified by a good faith
attempt to meet the equally low price of a competitor, nor were the favorable spices justified by a cost
savings associated with doing business with the favored retailer." Id. at 13.
65 Dissenting Statement, supra note 61, at n.1 (citing Press Release, McCormick & Company,
Inc. McCormick Signs Settlement Agreement with Federal Trade Commission (Feb. 3, 2000)). See also
Complaint, supra note 64, at 5.
66 This is the traditional predatory standard articulated in Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown &
Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209 (1993).
67 Complaint, supra note 64, at 12. The Commission was therefore only required to show
competitive harm by one of two ways: (1) directly showing the disadvantage to disfavored retailers; or
(2) indirectly through the Morton Salt inference. The Morton Salt inference allows a finding of injury to
competition when a persistent price differential exists in a market where margins are low and
competition is intense. Fed. Trade Comm'n v. Morton Salt Co., 334 U.S. 37, 50-51 (1948).
68 Commissioners Swindle and Leary viewed the application of the Morton Salt inference as
inappropriate where the FTC does not also allege that larger buyers are receiving lower prices than
smaller buyers. Dissenting Statement, supra note 61. The Commissioners' argument makes economic
sense. If discounts were granted to favored purchasers as a result of the Bums price war, rather than as a
function of purchasing power, there is no reason to infer that favored stores received discounts across all
grocery products. The Commission majority goes to great lengths to point out that it relied not only on
the Morton Salt inference, but also upon evidence that McCormick was the largest supplier of spices in
the United States and demanded large percentages of shelf space from retailers. But these facts are
irrelevant to the Morton Salt inquiry. Assuming arguendo that McCormick's ability to extract
exclusivity from retailers was a function of monopoly power, such dominance does not imply that the
retailers receiving the largest payments from McCormick were also likely to receive larger payments
from other suppliers. Simply put, the dissenting Commissioners argue that McCormick was a primary-
line case argued on a secondary-line theory.
69 See Brook Group, 509 U.S. 209 (1993).
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from rivals. However, the primary line claim may have also been unsuccessful
if the contracts were of short duration. While there is no direct evidence of the
duration of these contracts, most slotting arrangements are six months to one
year in duration, therefore falling within the presumptive safe harbor in most
jurisdictions.7 °
What of the exclusive nature of McCormick's marketing arrangements
emphasized by the FTC? The complaint alleged:
McCormick has commonly included provisions that, much as is sometimes seen
with slotting allowances, restrict the ability of customers to deal in the products
of competing spice suppliers. Such provisions typically demand that the
customer allocate the large majority of the space devoted to spice products - in
some case 90% of all shelf space devoted to packaged spices, herbs seasonings
and flavorings of the kinds offered by McCormick - to McCormick.
Chairman Pitofsky defended the Commission's position by pointing to
McCormick's market power and the "fact that discounts to favored chains were
conditioned on an agreement to devote all or a substantial portion of shelf space
to the McCormick line of products." 72 The observation that promotional
payments are frequently observed alongside exclusivity provisions is
inappropriately cited in support of the conclusion that this combination makes
anticompetitive inferences appropriate.
To the contrary, this combination is entirely unremarkable because
exclusionary distribution terms are used to minimize the costs associated with
dealer free-riding on the manufacturer's promotional payments, which solve a
pervasive dealer undersupply problem with respect to promotional effort. These
vertical restraints enhance the transactors' abilities to facilitate promotional
performance under the contract.
The availability of the Act's weaker standard suggests a backdoor for
plaintiffs unable to meet the more stringent burden of proving competitive
injury in a monopolization or primary-line claim. While it is doubtful that the
FTC's prosecution of McCormick represents a revitalization of the Act, the
prosecution does create uncertainty for manufacturers in the growing number of
industries relying on retailer promotional effort and product placement for
sales.
3. Bundled Rebates as Competition for Distribution
In the wake of the Third Circuit's ruling in LePage's, Inc. v. 3M Co.
7 3
holding 3M liable under section 2 for offering retailers bundled rebates in
70 FTC STUDY, supra note 15, at iii n. 14; FTC REPORT, supra note 24, at 11.
71 Complaint, supra note 64, at 10.
72 McCormick & Co., Inc., FTC File No. 961-0050, Statement of Chairman Robert Pitofsky,
and Comm'rs Sheila F. Anthony and Mozelle W. Thompson (hereinafter "Majority Statement"),
available at http://ftc.gov/os/2000/03/mccormickrpslamwtstatement.htm.
73 324 F.3d 141 (3rd Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 542 U.S. 953 (2004).
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exchange for the purchase of increasing portions of its product line, the role of
bundled rebates in raising barriers to entry has been a frequently discussed
topic in the antitrust literature. 74 The antitrust literature has subsequently
focused attempts to articulate tests capable of identifying consumer welfare-
decreasing bundled rebates.
75
Nalebuff, for example, argues that exclusionary bundling occurs when the
incremental price of an XY bundle over the standalone Y price is less than the
bundler's long run average variable costs of X When X and Y are consumed in
variable proportions, the competitive price of X minus the implied discount on
X required to retain consumers must be above the monopolist's long run
average variable costs. This is the test adopted in Ortho Diagnostics Systems v.
Abbott Labs.76 Greenlee et al. propose a test that would condemn bundled
rebates where the stand alone price of Y, where available, is greater than the
monopoly price in the non-bundling equilibrium. While these models are useful
in terms of identifying the possibility of exclusionary bundled rebates, the
implications of these models for antitrust law are less clear because they do not
consider other efficiency reasons for the practice and are equivocal in their
conclusions regarding welfare.
The primary challenge facing the creation of an antitrust rule that would
successfully identify promotional practices that decrease consumer welfare on
net is that such a rule must account for the pass-through of manufacturer
payments to consumers, as well as other possible efficiency benefits. The
existing models of exclusionary bundling purposefully ignore these potential
benefits and fail to offer a methodology for calculating the trade-off between
consumer benefits and the potential for consumer harm.
Viewing bundled rebates as a form of competition for distribution informs
the antitrust analysis. Bundled rebates, like slotting allowances and discounts,
may be viewed as a method to compensate distributors for providing promotion
that would not otherwise occur, and are likely to be an important component of
the competitive process where consumers are sensitive to point-of-sale services
74 See, e.g., Barry Nalebuff, Bundling as a Barrier to Entry, 119 Q.J. EcON. 159 (2003)
[hereinafter Nalebuff, Barrier to Entry]; Steya Kolay et al., All-Units Discounts in Retail Contracts, 13
J. ECON. & MGMT. STRATEGY 429 (2004); Barry Nalebuff, Bundling, Tying, and Portfolio Effects
(United Kingdom Dep't of Trade & Indus., Economics Paper No. 1, 2003) [hereinafter Nalebuff,
Portfolio Effects]; see also Kobayashi, supra note 18, Survey of the Economic Literature (giving a
useful survey of these and other bundling models).
75 See, e.g., Daniel A. Crane, Multi-Product Discounting: A Myth of Non-Price Predation, 72
U. CHI. L. REv. 27 (2005); Barrier to Entry, supra note 74; Patrick Greenlee et al., An Antitrust Analysis
of Bundled Loyalty Discounts (Justice Department, EAG Discussion Paper, EAG 04-13, 2004). These
tests are discussed at length in Kobayashi, Two Tales, supra note 18. See also Letter from Timothy J.
Muris, Professor, George Mason University School of Law, to Deborah A. Garza, Chair, Antitrust
Modernization Commission (July 15, 2005) (reviewing the modem industrial organization literature and
concluding that it "does not supply a reliable way to distinguish uses of bundling that are on net
procompetitive from those that are anticompetitive") (on file with author).
76 920 F. Supp. 455 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
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and incremental sales are highly profitable. Further, it is important to note that
bundled rebates are passed on from competitive retailers to consumers.
An economic analysis of bundled rebates mapping into an administrable
antitrust rule is likely to require fact-intensive analysis rather than abstract and
highly stylized modeling. While these models suggest that bundled rebates
might prove exclusionary under some conditions, it is generally assumed that
the contracts have no efficiency enhancing properties. 77 The goal of this
discussion is not to provide a general theory of bundled rebates, but simply to
show that bundled rebates are similar to substitute forms of competition for
distribution, such as slotting and quantity discounts, which are efficiency-
enhancing methods of increasing highly profitable promotional sales.
78
Viewing bundled rebates as part of the competitive process for
distribution leads one, when assessing competitive effects, to focus on the
question of whether this process is open to rivals, rather than whether the
conditions of stylized models have been satisfied. I believe such a shift in focus
would be an improvement for antitrust policy as a general matter, as there is a
void of empirical evidence suggesting that practices satisfying the conditions of
these models cause a decrease in consumer welfare. A first principle of
regulation of the competitive process for distribution should be to limit liability
to situations where rivals are not able to compete for distribution on equal
footing with the dominant firm.
B. Exclusivity and Category Management as Bad Conduct
The competitive process for distribution frequently involves the use of
exclusionary terms that have also been the subject of antitrust challenge.
Continental T. V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania requires such non-price vertical
restraints to be analyzed under the rule of reason.79 Antitrust analysis of vertical
77 Timothy Muris describes the state of the modem industrial organization economics as
"justitqying] concern about virtually any practice." Muris, supra note 75, at 73. It is important to note
that even under the narrow conditions of the exclusionary bundling models, consumer welfare typically
increases in the bundling equilibrium. See, e.g., Nalebuff, Barrier to Entry, supra note 74; Timothy J.
Brennan, Is Competition the Entry Barrier? Consumer and Total Welfare Benefits of Bundling (Oct. 24,
2005) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author). Proponents of these models argue that short-run
consumer welfare benefits increase to the expense of long run anticompetitive effects that are generally
not captured in the model. Carlton and Waldman incorporate dynamic effects into their tying model but
warn against relying on these models to design antitrust policy. Dennis W. Carlton & Michael Waldman,
How Economics Can Improve Antitrust Doctrine Towards Tie-In Sales, 1 COMPETITION POL'Y INT'L 27,
n.31 (2005); Dennis W. Carlton & Michael Waldman, The Strategic Use of Tying to Preserve and
Create Market Power in Evolving Industries, 33 RAND J. ECON. 194, 215 (2002).
78 See also Kobayashi, Survey of the Economic Literature, supra note 18, at 708 ("bundled
discounts give retailers strong incentives to promote and sell the manufacturer's goods and services, and
can mitigate retailer free-riding and other types of agency problems. Thus, bundled discounts can serve
the same efficiency-promoting vertical control functions as have been identified in the economic
literature on tying, exclusive dealing, and other forms of vertical restraints"); Mudis, supra note 75, at 17
("[b]undled rebates, therefore, can serve the same efficiency-promoting functions as has been identified
in the literature examining the use of exclusive dealing and other forms of vertical restraints").
79 433 U.S. 36 (1977).
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non-price restraints has remained faithful to Sylvania's teachings by focusing
on the "market impact" of the restraints. Economic theory suggests that
exclusionary contracts may have an anticompetitive market impact when they
raise a rival's costs by depriving the rival of the opportunity to achieve efficient
scale for a significant period of time.
A number of necessary economic conditions follow from this theory. The
most frequently discussed condition in this analysis is foreclosure. Foreclosure
of a share of distribution sufficient to force a manufacturer's rivals to operate at
less than minimum efficient scale will result in a cost disadvantage to existing
competitors and potential entrants. If this condition persists for a significant
duration of time, competitive injury can occur as the duration of the
monopolist's reign is extended. Exclusive dealing jurisprudence has, in large
part, embraced an analytical approach that is consistent with economic theory.
One commentator notes that modem decisions generally attach liability only
upon foreclosure greater than 40% for liability.
80
Even where foreclosure does not exceed 40%, however, antitrust liability
often attaches in the absence of a reasonable pro-competitive justification. In
many cases, the most frequently recognized justification for use of exclusivity,
protection of manufacturer-supplied investments, does not fit the facts. When
there is no immediately apparent pro-competitive rationale for exclusivity,
courts frequently shift the liability burden to the firm using the exclusive
contract on the grounds that competition does not appear to be occurring on the
merits. This narrow search for efficiency justifications is partially attributable
to economists' failure to explain the broader set of free-riding problems
confronting manufacturers and retailers.
8 1
As described in Part I, exclusionary contracts play an important role in
minimizing a broad set of free-riding incentives inherent in retail promotion
contracts, and not simply the Telser-type, discount free-riding problems
frequently accepted by courts as an efficiency justification. Distribution
contracts including exclusionary terms frequently do not involve the type of
manufacturer investments that lend themselves to discount free riding.
Consumers are not likely to frequent a retailer supplying premium shelf space
to a particular product before purchasing it at a "no frills" retailer. Rather,
exclusivity in these contracts minimizes costs associated with dealer free-riding
on manufacturer promotional payments by either pocketing the payments
without supplying the desired services or promoting rival brands.
80 Jacobsen, supra note 27, at 318.
81 Retailers will find it uneconomical to supply promotional effort where the presence of
discounters threatens to eliminate the return to the retailers' investment. Customers consume the
promotional services at the full-service retailer before purchasing the item for a lower price at the
discounter. Solving this type of free-riding, analyzed by Lester G. Telser in his classic article, Why
Should Manufacturers Want Fair Trade?, 3 J.L. & ECON. 86 (1960), is the only justification for
exclusionary distribution contracts discussed in the recent FTC Report. FTC REPORT, supra note 15, at
39.
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Business school students are commonly taught that producers use
exclusive dealing where they "hope to obtain more dedicated and
knowledgeable selling. ' 82  Manufacturers frequently assert that these
agreements increase dealers' dedication to their product, and similar defenses
have been recognized in a handful of antitrust cases, although there is no
formalized economic explanation in the cases for the role of exclusive dealing
in increasing dealer loyalty.
83
Category management practices have also been challenged under section 2
of the Sherman Act. When viewed from the competition for distribution
perspective, category management is a far less suspicious practice than has
been suggested.84 Again, because shelf space payments also create dealer free-
riding incentives, transactors will seek devices to minimize these free-riding
costs and facilitate valuable promotional performance. Category management is
one such mechanism, allowing manufacturers to minimize these free-riding
costs without resorting to an exclusive dealing term, which retailers may find
prohibitively costly when consumer demand for variety is substantial.
C. Operationalizing Naked Exclusion
The narrow view of the role of exclusionary contracts in preventing free-
riding frequently runs the risk of treating efficient distribution contracts as
"naked" attempts at exclusion, found to violate the antitrust laws without a full-
blown inquiry into their market impact. 85 For example, the Microsoft court
appears to prematurely shift the liability burden to the defendant as a result of
the failure to produce a persuasive business justification for its exclusive
dealing contracts with Internet access providers. 86 Notably, the burden shifted
82 KOTLER, supra note 2, at 513.
83 See, e.g., Roland Mach. Co. v. Dresser Indus., 749 F.2d 380, 395 (7th Cir. 1984); Sulmeyer
v. Coca-Cola Co., 515 F.2d 835, 840 n.2 (5th Cir. 1975) ("exclusive dealing leads dealers to promote
each manufacturer's brand more vigorously than would be the case under nonexclusive dealing");
Hendricks Music Co. v. Steinway, Inc., 689 F. Supp. 1501 (N.D. I11. 1988); Joyce Beverages v. Royal
Crown Cola Co., 555 F. Supp. 271 (S.D.N.Y. 1983). Klein & Lerner, supra note 10, show that exclusive
dealing solves free-riding problems associated with the more general phenomenon of insufficient dealer
promotion by giving dedicated dealers the incentive to promote. See also Benjamin Klein, Exclusive
Dealing as Competition for Distribution on the Merits, 12 GEO. MASON L. REv. 119 (2003).
84 See Klein & Wright, supra note 12.
85 Conduct that harms rivals and is without an intuitive business justification is frequently
defined negatively as "not competition on the merits," following the famous formulation of Professors
Areeda and Turner. See, e.g., Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585, 595-97,
605 & n.32 (1985) (quoting P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, ANTITRUST LAW 78 (1978)). This may also
describe the state of European Community doctrine where abuse of a dominant position is roughly
defined as conduct by a dominant firm that both (1) hinders competition and (2) is not "normal
competition." Case 85/76, Hoffman-La Roche & Co. AG v. Comm'n, 1979 E.C.R. 461 paras. 89-91
(1979). Many commentators have criticized this distinction as mysterious, vacuous and problematic.
See, e.g., Einer Elhauge, Defining Better Monopolization Standards, 56 STAN. L.REv. 253, 265-66
(2003).
86 See United States v. Microsoft Corp., 87 F. Supp. 2d 30, 52-53 (D.D.C. 2000), aff'd in part,
rev'd in part, 253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
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despite the fact that the foreclosure was nominally below 40%.87 Other
commentators have noted that defendants with market power rarely prevail in
exclusionary distribution cases by asserting a valid business justification after
the plaintiff meets its prima facie burden.
88
Conwood Co. v. United States Tobacco Co.8 9 fits this pattern. United
States Tobacco was category manager in a number of retail outlets and
therefore had significant input with respect to product allocation, as well as in-
store marketing decisions. Conwood alleged that United States Tobacco injured
competition by: (1) removing and destroying competitors' display racks
without permission of store management; (2) training its salespeople to take
advantage of store clerks; (3) providing misleading information to retailers in
order to trick them into believing that United States Tobacco's products were
better selling; and (4) entering into exclusive agreements with retailers. 90 The
Sixth Circuit took great pains to distinguish conventional exclusive dealing
from United States Tobacco's conduct as category manager and the allegations
of product destruction.
91
While destruction and lying are obviously not efficiency-enhancing
conduct, United States Tobacco argued that its category management program
helped retailers efficiently allocate shelf space, increased consumer loyalty, and
improved the presentation of products. The court dismissed these arguments
out of hand. It was Conwood's burden, nonetheless, to show evidence of
anticompetitive effects. So what evidence did Conwood produce to satisfy this
burden? The evidence consisted primarily of expert testimony showing that a
10% increase in United States Tobacco shelf space was correlated with a 7%
increase in moist snuff retail prices. 92 The court ruled that this evidence was
alone sufficient to satisfy Conwood's burden and proceeded to this issue of
calculating damages. 93 However, the evidence was not uncontroverted. The
record also includes the following evidence: (1) Conwood's market share, and
the market shares of several competitors, increased during the relevant time
period;94 (2) the market experienced a 45% increase in output; 9 5 (3) successful
87 253 F.3d at 70-71.
88 Andrew I. Gavil, Exclusionary Distribution Strategies by Dominant Firms: Striking a
Better Balance, 72 ANTITRUST L.J. 3 (2004).
89 290 F.3d 768 (6th Cir. 2002). Klein & Wright, supra note 12, discuss Conwood and the
economic function of category management in facilitating contract performance.
90 Klein & Wright, supra note 12, at 778-79.
91 Id.
92 Id. at 789.
93 The damages calculation in Conwood has been subject to heavy criticism for its failure to
separate out the sales lost to illegal conduct from those lost to legitimate competition and other factors.
See, e.g.. D.H. Kaye, Adversarial Econometrics in United States Tobacco Co. v. Conwood Co., 43
JURIMETRICS 343 (2003); D.H. Kaye, The Dynamics of Daubert: Methodology, Conclusions, and
Statistical Fit in Econometric Studies, 87 VA. L. REV. 1933 (2001).
94 Id. at 789-90.
95 Id. at 789.
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entry by new brands;96 and (4) United States Tobacco enjoyed a modest 10%
success rate at obtaining exclusive product display racks.97 What is notable
about the Sixth Circuit's analysis is that the liability burden was satisfied
largely by anecdotal evidence of United States Tobacco's obviously bad
conduct, in lieu of any serious attempt to figure out the degree of foreclosure. A
reasonable hypothesis is that the conventional analysis was set aside as a result
of the lack of any obvious competitive justification for the conduct at issue.
District court decisions are not immune to this trend. Consider Avery
Dennison Corp. v. Acco Brands, Inc.98 Avery had at least a 75% share of
market for the sale of machineable labels to commercial customers in the
United States. The court denied Avery's motion for summary judgment, finding
that the cash payments and rebates Avery offered to customers in exchange for
exclusivity were likely to be recouped through supracompetitive pricing.
99
Avery made payments of up to $2 million, and one contract included a three-
year exclusivity term. The court relied heavily on Avery's own internal "hot
documents" which contained predictably aggressive business propositions.
00
The court's analysis is troublesome for a number of reasons. Like in
Conwood, the analysis eschewed a rigorous analysis of the likely competitive
effects in favor of anecdotal evidence and "hot documents."'0 1 Further, Avery
offered significant evidence that payments for distribution were a normal part
of the competitive process. In fact, it appeared that the plaintiff paid slotting
fees and offered various rebates and that these payments were a competitive
reality of the marketplace. 1° 2 The court ultimately found that Avery's internal
documents, success in obtaining brand loyalty, and payments for exclusivity
alone were sufficient to create a triable fact as to competitive harm. It is
difficult to imagine an easier standard for survival of summary judgment.
96 Id.
97 Id. at 775.
98 No. CV99-1877DT(MCX), 2000 WL 986995 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 22, 2000).
99 Id. at *25.
100 Id. at *24. One internal Avery document stated that "[w]e will use the time bought
through multiyear agreements to build an Avery consumer franchise fortress. The consumer leverage we
develop will allow us to renegotiate better backend deals upon termination of the multiyear deals." Id. at
* 19. Another described Avery's marketing strategy as to "go on the attack in ways that we can withdraw
from if and when we are successful, so that the higher level of cost to the business has a chance of not
being permanent." Id. On problems with the use of "hot documents" to determine whether antitrust
violations have occurred, see Geoffrey A. Manne & E. Marcellus Williamson, Hot Docs v. Cold
Economics: The Use and Misuse of Business Documents in Antitrust Enforcement and Adjudication, 47
A~iz. L. REv. 1609 (2005).
101 The court did discuss "entrenched buyer preferences," and "Avery's ties with its
commercial customers" as barriers and concluded that Acco's payment of slotting fees for placement
were the result of these barriers. Id. at * 14. Why these payments are considered barriers to entry rather
than part of the competitive process for distribution is unclear and unexplained by the court.
102 Avery appeared to rely on the argument that slotting payments and rebates for exclusivity
were commonplace in the market rather than asserting an affirmative business justification defense, such
as a free-rider claim, explaining its use of exclusivity.
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Some debate exists as to whether the results in Microsoft, Conwood,
LePage's, Avery, and other recent distribution cases constitute a disturbing
trend in antitrust analysis. 0 3 I believe these cases, combined with the specter of
Robinson-Patman prosecution, expose the failure of antitrust to articulate a
workable standard for a large set of common marketing arrangements.
The analysis here provides a few immediate solutions. One simple step
toward solving this problem would be to recognize the role of exclusive dealing
and category management as valid business justifications minimizing dealer
free-riding. Although courts occasionally recognize exclusive dealing contracts
as ensuring "undivided loyalty" among dealers, this description does not
adequately embrace the role of this class of contracts in facilitating contract
performance.
Partial exclusion, exclusive dealing and category management provide
transactors a set of tools available to control free-riding incentives created by
the use of promotional payments for shelf space. Identifying the most efficient
tool for the job will depend on the nature of the free-riding incentive, consumer
demand for inter-brand variety and other factors. These tools allow the parties
to maximize the return on the manufacturer's promotional investments and reap
the fruits of their relationship by controlling the costs of dealer free-riding.
Beyond these immediate solutions, Part III argues in favor of two
improvements to current antitrust analysis of distribution arrangements in light
of the economic analysis in Part I.
III. Improving Antitrust Standards
The potential dangers of falsely condemning competitive conduct are well
known. 104 Those error costs are exacerbated when one deals with unfamiliar
forms of competition. 105 In dynamic distribution environments, the myriad of
competitive tools available to manufacturers and retailers often involve novel
business practices such as slotting allowances, bundled rebates, and category
management. The key economic feature of these agreements is that they are
components of the competitive process for distribution, which generally
103 See, e.g., Elhauge, supra note 85; Kenneth L. Glazer & Brian R. Henry, Coercive v.
Incentivizing Conduct: A Way Out of the Section 2 Impasse?, 18 ANTITRUST 45 (Fall 2003) ("a
consensus seems to be emerging that not all is right with how cases of this kind are handled by the
courts"); Brief of Amici Curiae Economics Professors in Support of Respondent at 3-4, Verizon
Comm'cns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 538 U.S. 905 (2003) (No. 02-682) (describing
the problem of identifying exclusionary conduct as "vexing"). Not all commentators find the section 2
standards so troublesome. See Gavil, supra note 88, at 51 ("There is no data to support the conclusion
that Section 2 is over-deterring some kind of 'legitimate' conduct.").
104 See, e.g., Verizon Comm'cns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398,
414 (2004).
105 One is reminded of Ronald Coase's observation that "if an economist finds something - a
business practice of one sort or another - that he does not understand, he looks for a monopoly
explanation." Ronald Coase, Industrial Organization: A Proposal for Research, in POLICY ISSUES AND
RESEARCH OPPORTUNITIES IN INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 67 (Victor R. Fuchs ed., 1972).
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produces benefits to consumers in the form of lower prices, targeted price
discounts, and greater amenities.
The response of antitrust doctrine to the difficult task of trading off short-
run consumer benefits against potential anticompetitive consequences has been
largely consistent. In Brooke Group, for example, the Court held that plaintiffs
must satisfy a very difficult standard because above-cost discounting, which
benefits consumers, "is beyond the practical ability of a judicial tribunal to
control without courting intolerable risks of chilling legitimate price-
cutting. ' 0 6 Judge Breyer expressed a similar judgment in Barry Wright,
favoring existing consumer benefits over more speculative "birds in the
bush. 10 7 This is wisely designed policy which secures the immediate short-run
benefits to consumers in the absence of serious empirical evidence of
anticompetitive effects. Further, the predatory pricing standard is administrable,
creating a safe harbor upon which lawyers can confidently advise their clients
regarding antitrust exposure.108
Modem distribution antitrust jurisprudence might be described as
deviating from the generally accepted wisdom of the teachings of Brooke
Group and Barry Wright regarding the regulation of conduct producing both
obvious consumer benefits and some risk of anticompetitive harm.
A. Safe Harbors For Distribution Contracts
Building on these general principles, substantial room for improvement
exists within modem distribution jurisprudence. One strategy for improvement
has been to propose new tests aimed at distinguishing anticompetitive business
practices from those that are part of the normal competitive process.10 9 A
second strategy is to exploit current economic knowledge to create bright line
rules of liability, therefore providing guidance to firms and their counsel.
I follow the second path, attempting to identify bright line rules from our
current understanding of competition for distribution, thereby providing some
certainty regarding antitrust liability for dominant firms. I am able to identify
two safe harbors which are consistent with a standard attempting to identify
exclusionary conduct capable of producing competitive harm by depriving
rivals of efficient scale while minimizing false positives. Specifically, I argue
that the following contracts should be per se legal: (1) exclusionary contracts
foreclosing less than 40% of the market and (2) contracts of less than one year
in duration.
106 509 U.S. at 223, 234.
107 Barry Wright Corp. v. ITT Grinnell Corp., 724 F.2d 227, 234 (1 st Cir. 1983).
108 See, e.g., Muris, supra note 75, arguing in favor of the application of the Brooke Group
standard to bundled rebates.
109 See, e.g., Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585, 595-96, 605
n.32 (1985); POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW 195 (2nd ed. 2001); Elhauge, supra note 85; Glazer & Henry,
supra note 103.
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1. The Case for Per Se Legality for Foreclosure Less than 40%
A 40% safe harbor is largely consistent with the case law which routinely
dismisses claims where foreclosure does not reach that level.1 10 Though such a
safe harbor will not completely eliminate the uncertainty associated with
foreclosure analysis, because the degree of foreclosure will continue to vary
with how broadly the distribution market is defined, it will compel consistent
results for a large set of cases.
Others have made similar proposals. For example, Professor Elhauge has
recently proposed a standard making distribution contracts allowing a
monopolist to appropriate unexhausted scale per se legal, while all contracts
foreclosing more than 50% of distribution would be per se illegal.111 The
appropriate economic question is whether the degree of foreclosure is sufficient
to deprive rivals of minimum efficient scale. Because contracts that foreclose
less than 40% of distribution are unlikely to deprive rivals of the ability to
achieve minimum efficient scale, a safe harbor is appropriate.
A natural question is why a bright line liability rule is not equally
appropriate for those contracts foreclosing greater than 50% of distribution. In
short, such a rule does not appear to be based on sound economic theory or
empirical evidence. The empirical justification for the rule would be evidence
that economies of scale are exhausted well below 50% in the great majority of
industries. I am aware of neither theoretical nor empirical support for this
proposition.112 One might also argue that competition for contract to take
advantage of scale economies today might disadvantage rivals who may
become more efficient in the future as a result of changes in market demand or
technology." 3 However, responding to this remote threat does not require a
harsh rule sacrificing efficient behavior to achieve this goal. A rule declaring
short-term exclusionary contracts per se legal would solve this problem since
110 See Jacobson, supra note 27, at 324 n.85.
111 Elhauge, supra note 85.
112 Professor Elhauge does not rest his argument on such empirical evidence. Rather, Elhauge
argues that per se illegality is appropriate because the monopolist using contracts that foreclose greater
than 50% of the market, even if lowering its own costs, could have exploited those economies with less
restrictive means, such as vigorous price-competition or internal expansion (vertical integration). This
argument is problematic. A firm can always use means other than exclusionary contracts over any range
of output, though it may be significantly more costly to utilize one rather than the other. The kernel of
Professor Elhauge's reasoning is that it is better to allow "free market competition" to dictate firm size
"rather than to allow those issues to be determined by a form of private self-regulation through
discriminatory conditions." Id. at 325. It is unclear why competition resulting from competition for
contract rather than internal expansion differs from "free market competition." Elhauge defends this
proposition asserting that a monopolist's claim of efficiencies is analogous to the "well-accepted
rejection of the natural monopoly defense." Id. at 326. Professor Elhauge suggests that the costs of
condemning efficiency-enhancing conduct by monopolists will be outweighed by the costs of having the
merit of these claims determined by "an undistorted market test" rather than distribution contracts.
Hence, we return to the same notion that competition for contract is not "free market competition" and
somehow "distorts" the competitive process when a monopolist is involved.
113 See Elhauge, supra note 85, at 327.
Yale Journal on Regulation
such contracts would allow a firm that achieves most-efficient status in the
future to compete for distribution at asymptotically continuous intervals.
The immediate consumer benefits secured by allowing open and vigorous
competition for distribution suggest that we should protect these benefits where
rivals are able to bid openly for distribution, even where the competitive
process results in dominant share or monopoly. Antitrust law has been equally
accepting of competition for contract.1 14 Mistakenly ignoring this form of
competition in designing antitrust rules will result in chilling remarkable
amounts of consumer welfare-enhancing activity. A 40% foreclosure safe
harbor for exclusionary contracts would significantly reduce the incidence of
false positives.
2. Short-Term Contract Safe Harbor
The second proposed safe harbor would immunize contracts of up to one
year in duration (or longer if they are terminable at will). The duration of
exclusionary contracts has long been recognized as an important factor in
antitrust analysis. Contracts that successfully exclude rivals from the ability to
compete for distribution for long periods of time are objectionable on the
grounds that these contracts extend the duration of the monopolist's dominance
while rivals seek to realign distribution contracts. Contracts of short duration
are likely to allow rivals and potential entrants to compete for distribution to be
delivered in the immediate future, which should be in ample supply.
There are likely to be some economic and legal objections to such a safe
harbor. For instance, some might object to a one-year safe harbor on the
grounds that termination of agreements with short terms, even if terminable at
will, may prove difficult as a practical matter.' 5 One such practical difficulty is
the special case of short-term agreements with staggered expiration dates, and
another is switching costs.
Where distribution contracts expire at varied dates, it may prove difficult
for a rival or potential entrant to obtain distribution sufficient to support its
operation at minimum efficient scale. 116 Antitrust courts have seldom evaluated
114 For example, Judge Frank Easterbrook has explained, "Competition-for-the-contract is a
form of competition that antitrust laws protect rather than proscribe, and it is common." Paddock
Publ'ns, Inc. v. Chicago Tribune Co., 103 F.3d 42, 45 (7th Cir. 1996).
115 At least three modem cases support this proposition. See, e.g., United States v. Dentsply
Int'l, Inc., 2000-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 73,247, at 91,139-41 (D. Del. Mar. 30, 2001); Minnesota
Mining & Mfg. Co. v. Appleton Papers, Inc., 35 F. Supp. 2d 1138, 1144 (D. Minn. 1999) ("3M has
produced evidence that Appleton's sole-sourcing agreements often include incentives that have the
practical effect of tying up the paper sheet inventory of a merchant over a period of several years.");
United States v. Dairymen, Inc. 1983-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 65,651 & 65,704 (W.D. Ky. 1983)
(enjoining requirements contracts covering large percentage of the market though only 30 days to one
year in duration), aff'dper curiam, 758 F.2d 654 (6th Cir. 1985).
116 This claim is frequently asserted in the antitrust literature. See, e.g., JEAN TIROLE, THE
THEORY OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 198 (M.I.T. Press 1998) (noting that a model of a dominant
firm's decision with respect to contract duration would "shed some light on the common allegation that
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claims that staggered expiration dates prevent rivals from competing for
distribution. In United States v. Pullman Co., the court addressed Pullman's
sleeping car service contracts with the railroads of the United States.117 The
court, in condemning Pullman's long term contracts (the majority lasting 15
years or longer) under the Sherman Act, noted that the staggered expiration
dates increased Pullman's bargaining power in negotiating with individual
railroads.118 This is a distinct issue from whether potential sleeping car business
entrants were deterred from entry because of the staggered expiration dates,
though the court leaves one with the impression that it believed the staggered
dates were correlated with the lack of entry into the sleeping car industry in the
forty years preceding the action." 
9
Courts have infrequently dealt with staggered expiration dates in modem
exclusive dealing claims. In Amigo Gift Association v. Executive Properties,
Ltd., for example, the court considered and rejected on the merits a trade
organization's request for preliminary injunctive relief under Sherman Act
sections 1 and 2 against the owner of retail space which it leased to the
plaintiffs members despite the plaintiffs claims that staggered expiration dates
prevented competition.'
1 20
The argument that staggered expiration dates prevent competition for
distribution was rejected on behalf of the Seventh Circuit by Judge Easterbrook
in a rare case addressing the issue.1 21 In Menasha Corp. v. News America
Marketing In-Store, Inc., both parties were sellers of at-shelf coupon dispensers
sold to manufacturers for use in supermarket promotions. The defendant signed
exclusive contracts with retailers in different product categories, obligating the
retailer to forego the use of at-shelf coupon dispensers for competing products,
and offered retailers a portion of the manufacturer's payments.'22 The plaintiff,
Menasha, did not pursue such exclusive contracts. 123 Menasha argued that the
staggered expiration dates of the defendant's exclusive contracts prevented
Menasha from "organiz[ing] a network of retailers" to obtain "critical mass."' 24
established suppliers optimally deter entry through staggered contracts with their downstream
customers .. "); Steven C. Salop & R. Craig Romaine, Preserving Monopoly: Economic Analysis,
Legal Standards and Microsoft, 7 GEO. MASON L. REv. 617, 637-38 (1999) (citing the coordination
problems inherent in switching retailers when expiration dates are staggered in support of the claim that
"[b]idding for exclusives is not inherently 'competition on the merits"').
117 50 F. Supp. 123 (E.D. Pa. 1943).
118 Id. at 129 & n.8.
119 Id. (responding to Pullman's argument that any railroad is free to hire a competitor at the
expiration of its contract by noting that "there have been no others in the field since Pullman bought out
Wagner more than forty years ago").
120 588 F. Supp. 654, 656 (W.D. Mo. 1984). The court held that the plaintiff had shown
neither irreparable harm nor likelihood of success on the merits. Id. at 660.
121 Menasha Corp. v. News America Marketing In-Store, Inc., 354 F.3d 661 (7th Cir. 2004).
122 Id. at 662.
123 Id.
124 Brief of Plaintiff-Appellant Menasha Corporation at 26-27.
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Judge Easterbrook rejected Menasha's claim that staggered expiration dates
prevented competition for distribution.1
25
A second, more frequently asserted proposition is that switching costs
prevent termination as a practical matter.' 26 Switching costs are often
associated with brand loyalty-inducing effects of the manufacturer's payments.
The argument raised in these cases in not compelling. The economic question is
not whether costs are imposed on the dealer by switching to a rival
manufacturer. Dealers certainly incur costs by terminating the contract and
finding a new supplier. Not only did the dealer likely "price in" the potential
future switching costs when deciding whether to accept the manufacturer's
contract offer, but brand loyalty earned by the monopolist's investment is not a
barrier to entry in any meaningful sense of that term.
The real antitrust issue is whether staggered expiration dates, increased
consumer loyalty, or loss of payments can prevent rivals from openly
competing for distribution. The answer is "no" when the contracts are of short
duration. Sufficient distribution is likely to be available at any given time. The
argument that a rival manufacturer cannot come up with an appealing offer to
consumers is the analytical equivalent to the statement that the dominant firm
has submitted a superior bid. Antitrust rules should protect the bidding process,
not micro-manage the content of the bids. As long as contracts are of short
duration, the competitive process for distribution is fair to both incumbents and
rivals and should be left alone.
Professor Elhauge has articulated a number of other economically-
oriented objections to per se legality for short-term agreements. 27 Elhauge is
persuaded that collective action and seller-buyer collusion problems will "make
it in [buyers'] interests not to terminate an exclusionary agreement that offers
those discounts even though termination by all buyers would eliminate the
anticompetitive effect." 128 1 respond to each of these concerns in turn.
In the case of collusion between sellers and intermediate buyers, who in
turn sell to the ultimate downstream consumer, Elhauge argues that
intermediate buyers would have no incentive to terminate the agreement. The
125 354 F.3d at 663 (pointing out that Menasha does not seem to "notice the irony that under
its reasoning this sign-everyone-up strategy would create an unlawful monopoly" and that "[p]erhaps
Menasha should thank [the defendant] for keeping it on the straight and narrow."). Menasha's claim also
lacks credibility since it apparently never offered compensation or exclusive contracts, even to those
retailers with expired contracts. Non-Confidential Brief of Plaintiff-Appellant Menasha Corporation at
26-27, Menasha, 354 F.3d 661 (No. 03-1302).
126 In Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co. v. Appleton Papers, Inc., 35 F. Supp. 2d 1138, 1144 (D.
Minn. 1999), 3M argued that a "deeply rooted customer preference" also contributed to switching costs
that made leaving Appleton difficult. In Dentsply, 2000-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) T 73,247, the Department
of Justice argued that the agreements, as a practical matter, were "self-perpetuating" because dealers
would not abandon the popular Dentsply brand. Plaintiff United States' Memorandum in Opposition to
Defendant Dentsply's Motion for Summary Judgment at 34-35, United States v. Dentsply Int'l, Inc.,
(Civil Action No. 99-005(SLR)), available at www.usdoj.gov/atr/cases/f7000/7048.pdf.
127 Elhauge, supra note 85 at 340-41.
128 Id.
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classic case of buyers agreeing to an arrangement that allows sellers to facilitate
a cartel is the Standard Oil case.129 Elhauge argues that Standard Oil
exemplifies the problems with inferring that consumer welfare has increased
from dealer decisions to sign exclusionary agreements. Standard Oil, perhaps
the seminal empirical documentation of a successful strategy of raising rivals'
costs, did not involve unilateral conduct that is typically the subject of section 2
monopolization claims. Rather, it involved an agreement to facilitate a
horizontal price-fixing arrangement that would be per se illegal under section 1
of the Sherman Act. While horizontal collusion is certainly a problem that
antitrust enforcement should be concerned with, as it always has been, I do not
believe that the potential for horizontal collusion supplies any guidance for
designing monopolization law.
Elhauge also argues that the logic of collective action implies that a short
term contract safe harbor is inappropriate,' 30 because individual buyers will not
have sufficient incentive to terminate if other dealers do not do so as well. It is
true that dealers facing a collective action problem might rush to join the
manufacturers' cartel. 31 But this does not mean that dealers do not have the
incentive to leave the cartel. Consider a monopolist's exclusionary contracts
with distributors as analogous to a conspiracy among distributors organized by
a dominant manufacturer. An individual distributor has more to gain by
remaining outside the conspiracy and contracting with a rival manufacturer. 132
In the case of significant economies of scale in distribution (or economies of
scope), an individual distributor can supply a manufacturer with minimum
efficient scale. In these circumstances, a rival could defeat the exclusionary
scheme by winning a single distribution contract.
Lastly, Professor Elhauge argues that to the extent terminability is
relevant, it should cut against the procompetitive justifications offered for
exclusionary agreements. 133  He asserts that defendants asserting that
exclusionary contracts achieve efficiencies such as providing certainty in
supply, or encouraging relation-specific investments, or otherwise increase
efficiency are likely pretextual if buyers can terminate whenever they like.'
34
This analysis ignores the role of exclusionary contracts minimizing dealer
free-riding incentives. 135 The short-run gain to a dealer from violating its
129 Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911). See Elizabeth Granitz
& Benjamin Klein, Monopolization by "Raising Rivals' Costs": The Standard Oil Case, 39 J.L. &
ECON. 1 (1996).
130 See Elhauge, supra note 85, at 340.
131 The original exposition of this point was made in Eric Rasmusen et al., Naked Exclusion,
81 AM. ECON. REV. 1137 (1991); see also Ilya R. Segal & Michael D. Whinston, Naked Exclusion:
Comment, 90 AM. ECON. REv. 296 (2000).
132 This is not unusual. It is analytically identical to the familiar incentive to cheat on a
horizontal collusive agreement by expanding sales.
133 See Elhauge, supra note 85, at 341.
134 See id.
135 See supra Part 1.
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performance obligations under the agreement is always positive since
manufacturers do not always instantaneously detect nonperformance. Similarly,
agreements that are terminable at will also decrease the dealer's potential for
short-term gains appropriated by violating the parties' understanding.
However, the issue in antitrust cases is typically the role of the dealer's
right to terminate. The economic reasoning is analytically identical: allowing
the dealer to terminate at will reduces the manufacturer's incentive to violate
the implicit understanding of the parties' distribution arrangement since his
gains from doing so will be limited to only one period. The manufacturer's
performance obligation might be to supply a quality product, to supply it on
time, or any other form of performance that the parties mutually understand.
For example, consider the role of dealer termination in a category management
relationship wherein the manufacturer's performance obligation is to supply
sound advice regarding product allocation decisions and to supply sufficient
product variety to satisfy consumer demand. 36 In order to facilitate efficient
self-enforcement of these performance obligations, the dealer's right to
terminate at will is an essential part of the arrangement.
Finally, there is also a legal objection to the short-term contract safe
harbor. Specifically, the safe harbor conflicts on some level with Supreme
Court authority invalidating a number of exclusionary agreements that were of
short duration and terminable on short notice.' 37 The issue of presumptive
legality of short-term exclusionary contracts is still open to some debate in the
lower courts as well. 138 However, the majority of courts appear to adopt the
view that short-term exclusionary contracts are not likely to deprive rivals of
distribution.' 
39
136 See Klein & Wright, supra note 12.
137 See, e.g., Standard Fashion Co. v. Magrane-Houston Co., 258 U.S. 346, 352 (1922)
(invalidating agreements that were terminable upon three months notice); Standard Oil Co. of New
Jersey v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911).
138 See cases cited in note 115. In addition, the district court denied Coca-Cola's motion to
dismiss claiming that its distribution agreements were per se lawful because they were terminable at will
upon ten days' notice. Jacobson, supra note 27, at 337 (discussing this motion). The district court later
granted Coca-Cola's motion for summary judgment on the grounds that Coke did not have market
power in the relevant market. PepsiCo., Inc. v. Coca-Cola Co., 114 F. Supp. 2d 243 (S.D.N.Y 2000),
affdper curiam, 315 F.3d 101, 111 (2d Cir. 2002) (affirming the district court's market power findings
while briefly noting that Coca-Cola's exclusive distributorships are short in duration and terminable at
will).
139 Most recently, the First, Second, Fourth, Seventh and Ninth Circuits have embraced the
notion that contracts terminable in less than one year are either presumptively legal or most likely are
unable to foreclose rivals. See CDC Technologies., Inc. v. IDEXX Labs, Inc., 186 F.3d 74 (2d Cir.
1999); Omega Envtl., Inc. v. Gilbarco, Inc., 127 F.3d 1157, 1163 (9th Cir. 1997) ("short duration and
easy terminability of these agreements negate substantially their potential to foreclose competition");
Paddock Publ'ns, Inc. v. Chicago Tribune Co., 103 F.3d 42, 47 (7th Cir. 1996) ("the FTC and the
Supreme Court concluded that even exclusive dealing contracts are lawful if limited to one year's
duration"); Thompson Everett, Inc. v. Nat'l Cable Adver., 57 F.3d 1317, 1325 (4th Cir. 1995); U.S.
Healthcare, Inc. v. Healthsource, Inc., 986 F.2d 589, 596 (1st Cir. 1993); Roland Mach. Co. v. Dresser
Indus., Inc., 749 F.2d 380, 395 (7th Cir. 1984).
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The argument that Supreme Court precedent prohibits such a safe harbor
is not without force. "Old" case law that is largely ignored in modem antitrust
analysis has been part of the antitrust policy landscape, for better or worse, for
many years. 140 A strict interpretation of Supreme Court precedent would render
at least the modem law of horizontal merger, vertical integration, exclusive
dealing, and tying useless.14 1 This would be an absurd result that should be
avoided if it at all possible. Admittedly, designing modem antitrust policy in a
manner that ignores the precedential value of traditionally disregarded "old"
case law is certainly not ideal. Modem common law has evolved in just this
fashion. The first-best solution is clearly to take weak and outdated precedent
off the books rather than design antitrust laws around obsolete economic and
legal thought regarding exclusionary contracts. Short of that, I believe that the
short duration contract safe harbor consistent with both modem exclusive
dealing case law and economic theory.
B. Application to Recent Exclusionary Distribution Cases
This Part addresses what impact these two proposed safe harbors would
have on important exclusionary distribution cases by applying the standard to
the following nine appellate decisions: Microsoft, LePage's, Conwood,
Concord Boat,142  Virgin Atlantic,143  RJR II, Coca-Cola, Omega, and
Dentsply. 144 A complete analysis of the conduct at issue in each specific case is
beyond the scope of this article.
140 Horizontal merger decisions prior to General Dynamics are a very good example of "old"
case law that no longer influences modem antitrust policy. I have advocated overturning these outdated
and weak precedents due to the risks that they might influence modem antitrust policy through private
actions or otherwise. Wright, supra note 34, at 746-47. An excellent example in the vertical merger
context is Ford Motor Co. v. United States, 405 U.S. 562 (1972), which invalidated Ford's purchase of
Electric Autolite, a sparkplug manufacturer, on the basis that the merger would harm competition
because rival sparkplug manufacturers would be foreclosed from sales to Ford (10% of the market).
There are, of course, many other excellent examples.
141 Professor Elhauge also argues that because all contracts that are unreasonable restraints of
trade are not enforceable at common law, the contracts have always been terminable at will. Combining
this insight with the fact that antitrust liability still lies for agreements in restraint of trade in the face of
terminability at will, Professor Elhauge concludes that terminability at will has no place in determining
antitrust liability. He argues that the assertion that terminability at will can immunize conduct from
antitrust liability would thus render horizontal price-fixing agreements per se legal. See Elhauge, supra
note 85, at 342. This is incorrect. The point of the safe harbor is not one of mere formality, but economic
substance. The safe harbor protects such agreements that are terminable at will because, as a matter of
economics, they cannot result in anticompetitive harm. Compare this to a horizontal price-fixing
agreement, which can reduce social welfare whether the agreement is terminable at will or of long
duration. This substantive difference provides the rationale for creating immunity for conduct that
cannot produce anticompetitive effects. I disagree with Professor Elhauge that the necessary implication
of this distinction is to "take Sherman Act § I and Clayton Act § 3 off the books, as well as any
application of Sherman Act § 2 to exclusionary conduct that requires buyer acquiescence." Id.
142 Concord Boat Corp. v. Brunswick Corp., 207 F.3d 1039 (8th Cir. 2000).
143 Virgin Atil. Airways Ltd. v. British Airways PLC, 257 F.3d 256 (2d Cir. 2001).
144 United States v. Dentsply Int'l, Inc., No. 03-4097, 2005 WL 426818 at *1 (3d Cir. Feb. 24
2005).
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The short-term safe harbor would change only the outcome of Dentsply,
where the Third Circuit recently overturned the district court's judgment in
favor of the defendant. 145 There, the fact that the agreements were terminable at
will would immunize the manufacturer from liability on the grounds that
competition for Dentsply dealers, and others, was feasible on short intervals.
14 6
Though Omega, Coca-Cola, Concord Boat147 and R.JR I would also fall under
the safe harbor, this would not change the ultimate result in those cases.
Interestingly, the foreclosure safe harbor may have provided Microsoft
immunity under section 2 from challenges to its exclusive dealing contracts
with Internet access providers. The District Court conceded that the plaintiff
failed to produce evidence that "Microsoft's agreements excluded Netscape
altogether from access to [at least] forty percent of the browser market''148 but
held that Microsoft's arrangements gave rise to section 2 liability because they
excluded Netscape from the most efficient means of distribution. The D.C.
Circuit upheld the District Court's section 2 analysis. 149 Some may object that
this safe harbor would immunize agreements likely to cause anticompetitive
harm. However, the evidence of actual anticompetitive effect in Microsoft, is
not overwhelming and it should be emphasized that barriers to entry cannot be
increased without sufficient foreclosure. One of the key insights of the
economics of competition for distribution is that payments are passed on to
consumers and should be balanced alongside any anticompetitive potential in
designing antitrust rules. Microsoft's distribution contracts, for example,
resulted in the zero pricing of Internet Explorer and large promotional
payments to Internet access providers, both producing significant benefits for
consumers.
The remaining two cases are perhaps the most difficult to analyze:
Conwood and LePage's. Because both defendants conceded their market
power,'50 and neither was able to persuade the jury that its proffered business
145 See id. at * 1 (reversing judgment for manufacturer on the grounds that plaintiff did not
successfully prove the existence of monopoly power and its use to exclude rivals).
146 This was the crux of the district court's rejection of the Department of Justice's claim that
the contracts were anticompetitive. See United States v. Dentsply Int'l Inc., 277 F. Supp. 2d 387, 453
(D. Del. 2003) ("[D]irect distribution is viable, non-Dentsply dealers are available, and Dentsply dealers
may be converted at any time.").
147 207 F.3d at 1059. Most agreements were of one year duration and terminable at any time,
though an additional 1-2% were available for commitments of two to three years. Id. at 1059-60.
148 United States v. Microsoft Corp., 87 F. Supp. 2d 30, 52 (D.D.C. 2000), affd in part, rev'd
in part, 253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 122 S. Ct. 350 (2001). Though the district court does
not show its work in coming to a foreclosure share of less than 40%, Benjamin Klein has estimated the
percentage to be approximately 38% of total distribution based on the fact that the exclusives covered
approximately 55% of distribution, since 25% of users obtained their browsers directly from Internet
access providers and another 20% of users from the purchase of their home computer. Incorporating the
fact that Microsoft's exclusive contracts typically required Internet access providers to obtain a
maximum of 85% Internet Explorer usage, these facts would result in a foreclosure share of less than
40% (0.45 x 0.85 = 38%). Klein, supra note 11, at 127 n.23.
149 253 F.3d 34, 64 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
150 See LePage's Inc. v. 3M, 324 F.3d 141, 146 (3d. Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 124 S. Ct. 2932
(2004); Conwood Co. v. United States Tobacco Co., 290 F.3d 768, 782 (6th Cir. 2002).
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justification was valid, 151 both cases turned on the plaintiffs prima facie
evidence that the conduct was anticompetitive.
First, consider the impact of the 40% foreclosure safe harbor. It is unclear
whether the level of foreclosure created by the combination of United States
Tobacco's exclusive racks and destruction of Conwood's display racks would
have deprived Conwood of access to more than 40% of display racks. 152 From
the evidence in the record, it is unlikely that United States Tobacco's conduct
foreclosed 40% of display racks. To the contrary, United States Tobacco was
only able to obtain exclusive racks in 10% of retail stores, suggesting robust
competition for distribution and ample availability for rivals.
LePage's is also unclear on this point, in large part due to the paucity of
the record. The debate as to whether above-cost multi-product bundled
discounts should be treated as exclusive dealing, tying, or predatory pricing is
unresolved and likely to continue for some time. 153 3M's two exclusive dealing
contracts were ruled immaterial to the disposition of LePage S. LePage's did
not claim that 3M's promotional payments amounted to below-cost pricing,
155
opting instead to argue that 3M's discounts deprived it of "efficiencies of scale"
in the tape manufacturing business.1 56 Would 3M's bundled rebates foreclose
rivals from more than 40% of the market for distribution? Again, I am
skeptical.
The critical antitrust question is whether the competitive process for
distribution was open to LePage's to engage in competitive bidding, and it
appears that it was. LePage's offered its own price discounts to large customers
such as Wal-Mart, K-Mart, Staples, Office Max, and Walgreens. 157 The size of
these retailers suggests the presence of significant economies of scale in
151 See LePage's, 324 F.3d at 163-64; Conwood, 290 F.3d at 787 n.4 (rejecting defendant's
assertion that its conduct increased consumer loyalty and improved product presentation).
152 Conwood presented evidence that product destruction amounted to costs of $100,000 per
month. Conwood, 290 F.3d at 778. This analysis assumes that the short-term contract safe harbor would
not immunize United States Tobacco because Conwood's allegations included some forms of non-
contractual conduct.
153 See Crane, supra note 75; Gavil, supra note 88, at 34; Glazer & Henry, supra note 103, at
45; Nalebuff, Portfolio Effects, supra note 74 (arguing that an Ortho predatory pricing standard is
appropriate); Greenlee et al., supra note 75 (advocating a tying approach); Ronald W. Davis, LePage's
v. 3M: Five Ingredients in Search of a Monopoly Broth, ANTITRUST SOURCE (November 2004),
http://www.abanet.org/antitrust/source/11-04/Nov04-DavisI129.pdf, David L. Meyer, LePage's II: The
Third Circuit Revisits 3M's Bundled Discounts and Sees Unlawful "Exclusion' Instead of Above-Cost
Pricing, ANTITRUST SOURCE (July 2003), http://www.abanet.org/antitrust/source/07-03/meyer.pdf;
Muris, supra note 75 (arguing in favor of the Brooke Group standard).
154 LePage's, 324 F.3d at 157.
155 They could not have done so successfully since there was no evidence that 3M priced
below any relevant measure of cost even if one allocated all discounts in the product line to transparent
tape.
156 LePage's, 324 F.3d at 154-55.
157 Id. at 171-73 (Greenberg, J., dissenting). The Solicitor General's amicus brief notes that
the "Third Circuit did not say there was sufficient evidence for the jury to conclude that LePage's could
not have made comparable offers" to 3M customers. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae for
Respondents at 6, LePage's Inc. v. 3M, 324 F.3d 141 (No. 02-1865).
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distribution, which, if large enough to support a manufacturer of efficient scale,
would allow LePage's to achieve minimum efficient scale by winning a single
distribution contract. Therefore, while the record is not sufficient to calculate
the degree of foreclosure resulting from 3M's bundled rebate programs, the
evidence suggests that the contracts were not capable of depriving LePage's of
minimum efficient scale and therefore may have been immunized under the
foreclosure safe harbor.
IV. Conclusion
The increasing importance of manufacturer payments for distribution,
category management, and exclusive dealing suggests a dynamic environment
which will continue to present challenges for antitrust authorities. This world of
competition for distribution necessarily involves competition-for-contract,
where consumer benefits flow to consumers indirectly through payments to
distributors. Designing antitrust rules to govern the competitive process for
distribution is a challenging and important task, and some commentators
believe antitrust is failing."'
The economic insights collected in this paper show that manufacturer
payments and exclusionary distribution terms are frequently related
phenomena, the former increasing highly profitable promotional sales and the
latter minimizing dealer free-riding incentives created by those payments.
Competition for distribution results in the use of a variety of efficiency
enhancing contractual mechanisms. A key feature of these promotional
contracts, regardless of form, is that they produce significant benefits for
consumers.
Three significant policy implications are implicated by this analysis. First,
antitrust law should broaden its search for efficiency justifications to include
the pro-competitive role of promotional contracts in solving a pervasive
incentive incompatibility problem and the use of exclusionary terms and
category management in minimizing the retailer free-riding on the
manufacturer's compensation mechanism. Second, antitrust law should respect
the wisdom of Brooke Group and Barry Wright, which teach that short-run
benefits should not be sacrificed to protect against future harm without
convincing theoretical and empirical evidence of anticompetitive effects. Third,
a greater understanding of the economics of competition for distribution alone
will not provide much needed bright-line guidance to firms with dominant
market shares. The introduction of important safe harbors for promotional
contracts foreclosing less than 40% of distribution and for those shorter than
158 See David Balto, Ten Developments in the Antitrust Treatment of Category Management
and Slotting Allowances, ANTITRUST REP., Spr. 2004, at 103, 135 (commenting that "few areas are as
unsettled or need a foundation of clear guidance").
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one year in duration would significantly reduce false positives, providing
certainty without significant offsetting risks of competitive harm.

